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AN

ANSWER,

&c.

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(Answer)

AN ANSWER

TO THE

INQUIRY

INTO

THE STATE OF THE NATION;

WITH

Strictures on the Conduct of the present Ministry.

Ubi sunt, C. Pansa, illæ cohortationes pulcherrimæ tuæ, quibus a te excitatus senatus, inflammatus populus Romanus, non solum audivit sed etiam didicit, nihil esse homini Romano fœdius servitute?

CIC. PHILIP. 12.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE Inquiry into the State of the Nation appears, on a cursory perusal, the production of a superior mind. The reader is induced to believe, that the author has successfully illustrated general principles by the evidence of facts, and that his performance exhibits a combination of the enlightened views of the philosopher with the experience of the statesman. Had it possessed in reality this merit, had the soundness of argument equalled the elegance of its stile, that work would have deserved the patronage not of a minister

merely, but of the country—the attention not only of the present generation, but of posterity.

A second and more scrupulous perusal, however, will dispel the illusion. An attentive investigation of the arguments on which the author of this Inquiry has rested his opinions, will discover their fallacy in many cases, and their over-strained application in all. This work, which has been so generally circulated, and by some so much admired, will be found to prove a splendid superstructure on a false basis—like the newly-discovered relics of antiquity, interesting to contemplate, but which, when touched, crumble into dust.

In an inquiry into the state of this rich and powerful nation, it is singular that, except the character of our present mi-

nistry, there should not be discovered a single favourable circumstance in our situation—no cheering ray to diversify a picture of the most gloomy colouring. A melancholy note is struck at the beginning, and the doleful cadence continues to the end. The state of our public funds has entirely escaped the notice of this *impartial* writer. Our naval victories, although only a few months old, appear to have fled from his recollection. Perhaps he is prepared to argue, that flourishing finances, and unparalleled naval triumphs, have no connexion with our foreign relations, or with the state of the country.

Let us examine, in the first instance, the plan of the work before us, and how far its substance fulfils its title. The author confines himself almost entirely to

our *foreign relations*, and divides them into the following heads.

I. The late continental alliance.

II. The consequences of our late foreign policy.

III. The state of foreign affairs, independent of the late coalition and its consequences. Under this head the author discusses the origin of our war with Spain, and the neutral questions.

It is apparent from this outline, that the work under review is only nominally an Inquiry into the State of the Nation. In reality, it is an exposition of every unfavourable circumstance in the state of our relations with foreign powers. In other words, it is a most gloomy catalogue of

the difficulties under which the Right Honourable Secretary for the Foreign Department is desirous that the public should believe he has entered upon office. It concludes with lavishing the most profuse encomiums on the talents, experience, rank, and integrity of the Right Honourable Secretary and his friends.

Before proceeding upon an examination of the work, it is natural to inquire in what light Lord Grenville views its publication. We believe it is without example in the history of those constitutional parties which have divided the attachments of our countrymen, that a minister should lend his sanction to a pamphlet replete with the most bitter censure of his colleagues—a colleague who is not only a distinguished member of the cabinet, but the head of administration. The allusions

to the former conduct of the Noble Lord, are direct—the condemnation they convey is unqualified. The author dwells on the "high, unbending, unaccommodating tone which we have been accustomed to hold all over the world." Now, Lords Hawkesbury, Harrowby, and Mulgrave, the successors of Lord Grenville in office, have never even been accused of giving offence to foreign courts by haughty or unbending conduct. The reprobation so pointedly expressed in the Inquiry, is applicable, therefore, in a particular manner, to Lord Grenville. Indeed the author leaves us in no doubt in this respect. I shall quote his own words—"To have looked forward beyond the next year; to have taken measures in silence for the slow preparations of distant events; to have gradually disposed the minds of a people in our favour by kind treatment, for which no immedi-

ate return was expected, or won them by any other means than a manifesto from a commander, at the head of a paltry force; to have laid plans of war beforehand, which should not for some time burst into view with glare and noise: All this would have indicated a strange, unaccountable deviation from the system which has been unremittingly at work *since the treaty of Pilnitz**, by day and by night, during war and during truce, in aggran-

* Such were the expressions in the first edition of this work; but the author thought proper subsequently to strike out the words, "since the treaty of Pilnitz." Was Lord Grenville galled by the pointed censure of his conduct, which was thus spread abroad by his colleagues in office? Did Mr. Fox and his friends shrink from the just indignation they had roused, and attempt to eat their words? But was this mere withdrawing of so pointed an allusion a sufficient reparation for this public and gross insult? Or, indeed, does the mere omission of these five words in any degree alter the directness of the censure?

dizing the proud and crushing the humble."

These expressions require no comment. Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville are the acknowledged leaders of the cabinet, and I leave the reader to judge of the prudence of the minister who can give circulation to such unqualified accusations of the former conduct of his colleague.

The answer I propose to the present Inquiry may be properly divided into two parts,

I. An examination of the arguments adduced against the late ministry in regard to the last campaign as well as other continental affairs; and

II. An inquiry how far the present mi-

nistry have verified the predictions of our author, or justified the lofty encomiums he so confidently bestows on them.

In the first part, I will discuss, in succession, almost every important topic in the Inquiry. Without disputing with its author the superiority of rhetorical embellishment, I will fairly meet him on the legitimate ground of political disquisition —in a contest not of words but of facts— not in a stile of studied declamation, but in the direct and candid language of solid argument. Truth in politics, as in other subjects, generally lies in a narrow compass. She is to be found, not by indulging the excursive flights of imagination, but by a diligent, a scrupulous, a rigid exercise of reason.

In disproving the fallacies with which

this work is replete, I shall feel much satisfaction in lending my humble aid to the vindication of our late illustrious statesman. While I repel the aspersions of party, I shall not, however, attempt a complete illustration of his character. For such a task, I should feel my talents feeble and inadequate. Nor does his memory stand in need of panegyric, for it will remain engraven on the herts of his countrymen. But there is a living character of less imposing aspect, the discussion of whose merits is intimately connected with the object of my work. The "Inquiry into the State of the Nation" has been industriously patronised by the Right Honourable Secretary for Foreign Affairs. It would be inconsistent with his reputation for manly conduct to circulate what he did not believe; and I shall not, I presume, be contradicted, when I

consider as his the sentiments expressed in a work which has been currently termed the Manifesto of the new Ministry. In the Answer to the Inquiry, the Right Honourable Secretary, therefore, becomes a conspicuous object of attention. He has treated with ridicule the claims of his predecessors to public confidence—it is now time to examine his own. He has pourtrayed the late ministry as the most deficient of mankind in judgment and information. Let us scutinize the validity of his own pretensions to these qualities by an inquiry into the consistency of his opinions on several subjects of high interest—into their origin, their accuracy, and their depth. Such an inquiry will aid us to ascertain whether he is equally wise in Government as formidable in Opposition; whether he is in reality the great man he has been called; and whether his opinions

bear the stamp of reflexion and judgment or are the genuine offspring of a mind which conceives in precipitation and brings forth in error.

AN

ANSWER,

&c.

THE Author of the Inquiry begins by remarking, that previously to the commencement of hostilities, no attempt at negotiation was made. He enlarges on our having taken no step to procure "the mediation of Russia, a power equally favourable to us and the independence of Europe." But this disposition, while it afforded to us the strongest inducement to desire her mediation, was an insurmountable obstacle to its adoption by France. Bonaparte, in January, 1805,

soon after committing the grossest outrages against the laws of nations and the independence of neutral powers, in the seizure of Sir George Rumbold and the robbery of our Messenger, suddenly transmits to us a pacific overture. Our cabinet return an answer, at once manly and temperate, declining to enter into any negotiation until they should consult their allies, and particularly the Emperor of Russia. Had there been any probability that, on the part of France the mediation of Russia would have been accepted, our government would have been unquestionably most desirous to have urged the cause of justice under so favourable auspices. But all direct intercourse had ceased between Russia and France. Indignant as Russia was at the multiplied aggressions of France, is it probable that Bonaparte, although he granted passports to Novozilzoff, would have acceded to any proposition so specific as a negotiation for peace with England, under the mediation of Russia? He would have rejected the

overture, and accompanied his refusal with his characteristic disdain; unless, indeed, he committed to Talleyrand the composition of the reply. In this case, Russia would have received a vague and invidious answer, in the strain of that which he transmitted to Austria, on a similar proposition, at a subsequent period of the year—"That on the one hand from the nature of things, and on the other from the situation of circumstances, it was not even permitted to hope that the proffered good offices could be employed with advantage."

The seizure of Genoa, the author contends, was an inadequate cause for the rupture of the proposed overtures of Novozilzoff. It was inferior in importance, perhaps, to the invasion of Switzerland, or the incorporation of Piedmont; but an act of aggression is momentous, less from its political consequence, than from the spirit of the aggressor. Bonaparte had given very recent assurances of pacific dis-

position, both in his overture to our Court, and in granting passports to Novozilzoff. But he had scarcely subscribed his name to the latter pledge, when he violates good faith anew in the face of all Europe, by the seizure of one of its most ancient states. This act of perfidy, serious in itself from the importance of its object, was doubly dangerous, from the time of its execution. As demonstrative of his insatiable ambition and lawless violence, it was most alarming to all Europe. Need we then wonder that, to an independent state, it was the signal for breaking off the advances to a negotiation which could not even be commenced without dishonour?

The author next proceeds to argue, that the league had no precise or definite object in view. In opposition to so extraordinary a charge, I shall quote the Treaty itself.

Art. 2d of the Treaty of Concert at St. Petersburg, 11 *April,* 1805.

" The object of the league will be to carry into effect what is proposed by the present Concert, namely,

" *(a)* The evacuation of the country of Hanover and of the North of Germany.

" *(b)* The establishment of the independence of the republics of Holland and Switzerland.

" *(c)* The re-establishment of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont, with as large an augmentation of territory as circumstance will permit.

" *(d)* The future security of the kingdom of Naples, and the complete evacuation of Italy, the island of Elba included, by the French forces.

"*(e)* The establishment of an order of things in Europe, which may effectually guarantee the security and independence of the different states, and present a solid barrier against future usurpations."

On the first article our author makes no comment; but he affects to be doubtful of the meaning of the second, which stipulates the independence of Holland and Switzerland. He inquires, whether by this treaty is meant the nominal independence of these states, as had been already guaranteed by the treaty of Luneville; or their real independence, consisting in security from French influence during peace, and invasion during war. Is it possible to doubt that a league, formed expressly for establishing the independence of these republics, should not mean their *real* independence? Was it probable that so important a measure should have been adopted with no other object than their *nominal* independence, or that independence

for which the treaty of Luneville had provided, and which experience had demonstrated to be inadequate? The terms of the treaty of Luneville would at any time have been carried into execution by France, on condition of peace with England alone. But the confederacy was formed in order to get better terms; and its object was undoubtedly not merely the evacuation of these republics by the French troops, but the restoration of their barriers in the same condition as previous to the French revolution—barriers which, in the better times of Europe, had maintained for centuries the independence of both republics.

Our author appears entirely unacquainted with the nature of the Dutch frontier. His words are—"As soon as a new war breaks out—as soon as the occupation of Holland is of the smallest importance to France, or detriment to us, has she not the means of again over-running the Dutch territories in a week?" After so confident an assertion, we should be induced to

think that the Dutch barrier, once so famous, had been totally swept from the face of the earth. How has this writer, then, disposed of Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom, two of the strongest cities of the universe? Where has he placed Bois-le-Duc and Gertruydenberg, or has he forgot how much French blood was shed before the fortresses, comparatively inconsiderable, of Grave, Williamstadt, and Sluys? By every treaty between France and the United Provinces, all these places, as well as others of strength, have invariably constituted an integral part of the latter.

He proceeds to state, that "the whole of Flanders, from Ostend to Antwerp, from Antwerp to Wesel, is French. No barrier remains between the enormous mass of the French dominions, and the little, insulated, defenceless province of Holland. The strongest part of her frontier, the triple line of fortresses which surround France in the north, is opposed to the weakest side of the Dutch territories."

The whole of this extract, with exception of the two first lines, is erroneous. That part of the Dutch territories which is opposed to the French frontiers, instead of being their weakest side, is the strongest barrier in Europe. It contains the fortresses I have mentioned, and can besides be completely inundated in twenty-four hours. Our author calls it the weakest side of the Dutch territories. Now the fact is precisely the reverse; for it is their only strong side. Where else do they possess a fortress which deserves the name? Is this the sum of that volume of knowledge in foreign affairs which has been so lavishly ascribed to our Right Honourable Secretary in that department? And after this detection, what claim can an author have to our confidence?

In regard to Italy, likewise, he affects to consider the expressions in the treaty as vague and indeterminate. "The evacuation of Italy by the French troops," he says, "would be nugatory in its effect.

The whole Cisalpine territory is substantially a province of France, whether she rules it by French or Italian troops, and even if entirely freed from French armies, would continue under the influence of France, acknowledge her alliance, and receive her troops as soon as hostilities were renewed." I answer, that from Turin to Tarentum, the name of Frenchman is held in detestation. Let them fulfil the provisions of the treaty, by withdrawing their troops, and re-establishing the king of Sardinia in Piedmont, and not a vestige of French influence will remain in all Italy. The whole system established by Bonaparte, his boasted laws and institutions, would share from this indignant people a fate equally destructive with that of the unwary Frenchman who wanders from his corps to fall by the stiletto.

The author has, in this part of his work, put to himself a question, to which it will be gratifying to have a more explicit answer. "It may be asked," he says, "is

the situation of Europe so hopeless, that no means can be devised for accomplishing the grand objects which we have been rapidly surveying? Must Holland be united in fate with Belgium, and the Cisalpine decide the destinies of the south? The consideration of these matters belongs to a future stage of this inquiry." I have looked through the pamphlet in vain for a reply to this interrogation, and I solicit the author's attention to the pledge he has given us of his sentiments on so interesting a topic.

He proceeds to argue, that we hurried on the allies to a premature contest, before circumstances justified a conviction of their firm adherence to the league. He insinuates that our reliance on the hostility of Russia to France should have been doubtful, because their political relations had recently borne the aspect of good understanding. How completely is experience at variance with these arguments! Russia, firm to her purpose, continues

faithful to the alliance, and the resolute enemy of Bonaparte's insolence and aggrandizement. Austria, likewise, although fatally unsuccessful in the conduct of the campaign, was not inconstant to the league. She adhered to it with characteristic fortitude, and never forsook it until compelled by imperious necessity.

The author of the Inquiry next blames our government for forming treaties, and stipulating subsidies, with Russia and Sweden, before we had secured Austria. The answer is obvious. These powers, remote from France and safe from her hostility, durst form engagements, which at that early period of the alliance would have been the height of imprudence in her immediate neighbour. In cementing a general league, which is necessarily a work of time, and of communications between the respective powers too frequent to escape the eye of a watchful enemy, do you propose to begin with that power which, from its contiguity, he can make

the object of his immediate vengeance? Certainly not. The just and obvious policy is, let us make our arrangements in the first place with those powers who are safe from the resentment of France: let us next exhibit to Austria the nature and extent of the aid we have procured for her. It will then remain for her to determine whether that aid is such as to justify her to incur the hazard inseparable from a grand effort to resent the aggression of France.

Inconsistency is the genuine offspring of error; and the performance under review now affords a striking exemplification of this maxim. The author blames ministry for cultivating an intimate connexion with Russia, at a time when he conceives Austria was offended with that power. Yet, in the next page, he finds out that these two cabinets were so well reconciled, that the influence of Russia with Austria was *formidable*, and a princi-

pal cause of the court of Vienna acceding to the league.

The author of the Inquiry proceeds in a train of general reasoning, to argue that delay was infinitely desirable to Austria, and might be prejudicial to France. But the discovery has come too late. In order to have benefited the country, the late Opposition should have given us this information before the events of last campaign. Their sentiments, however, with the exception of Mr. Fox, were then highly favourable, not only to continental alliance, but to continental co-operation. On the opening of the session on the 15th January last year, Lord Grenville expressed anxiety not merely for a confidential intercourse with Russia, but for her active assistance. On the 20th June, Lord Carysfort blamed ministers for having been perfectly inactive for more than six months, in regard to continental connexions. Lord Grenville urged that no time should be lost,

either in acting with the continental powers as allies, or taking them as the umpires of our differences in open congress. Even Lord Howick, on the same day, urged a great and powerful co-operation on the continent. His speech, like those of the other members of Opposition, (except Mr. Fox) implied, that the alliance of either Austria or Prussia, joined to Russia, would form that great co-operation; for it was distinctly stated, that no one had ever been so sanguine as to expect the accession of both Austria and Prussia. The coalition actually formed was therefore not only in correspondence with the advice of Opposition, but its magnitude exceeded their demands, and surpassed the expectations of the most ardent. That was the time to have disclosed the circumstances in the situation of Austria which forbade her to tempt the hazards of war. But, on the contrary, although Austria was in the mouth of every speaker, no one seemed to think her situation unfavour-

able to active hostility; and all, except Mr. Fox, called for her co-operation. And such was the general satisfaction upon the developement of so extensive a confederacy, that the Opposition press, while they termed it a glorious coalition, made every exertion to deprive Mr. Pitt of the merit of its formation.

The events, however, of which Mr. Fox alone expressed an apprehension, have taken place. Had he then the gift of foresight? or was *he* alone, of all our statesmen, qualified to judge rightly on this most important subject? Appearances may suggest this conclusion; but an investigation of circumstances will condemn it. The opinion he so decidedly asserted, was supported by no conclusive arguments. We shall look in vain in his speech for any allusion to the superior talents of Bonaparte, or for any exposition of those errors on the part of confederacies, by which one vigorous opponent has generally been

enabled to overcome a coalition of several nations, united indeed by treaties, but differing both in their political views and in the conduct of their operations. Had he enforced the application of such considerations as these to the actual state of Europe, and deduced, in a chain of argument, those reasons which made him differ from all our other statesmen, he would have merited the reputation of superior judgment. We find, however, only a general allusion to the former disasters of Austria. She had been defeated, when acting alone in 1797 and 1800, and forced to sign the treaties of Leoben and Luneville. Mr. Fox mentioned these treaties; but he urged no arguments applicable to the new situation of Austria, when assured of the cordial co-operation of so formidable a power as Russia.

Was there not then a most material alteration in the state of circumstances, when to the solitary efforts of Austria was superadded the confederate strength of a sis-

ter empire? And, entertaining a conviction that both Austria and Russia, assisted by England, were unequal to cope with France, was it not incumbent on him to explain his reasons for so singular an opinion?

These reasons, I apprehend, we shall be forced to seek elsewhere than in the immediate subject of discussion. Mr. Fox has been through life the advocate of peace and the opponent of government—the prophet of success to France, and of failure to her adversaries. The French revolution had been formerly described by him as an event splendid but harmless. In 1802, when France had half a million of soldiers, he counsels a reduction of our army. Then, indeed, he assigned his reason. It was on account of the strength of our navy, and because the navy was a more constitutional force. In 1802, then, the danger from France does not appear to him sufficiently great to share his jealousy with the influence of the crown; but, in 1805, so

formidable does he consider France, that if England, Russia, and Austria, with united force, dare to take the field against her, the war is not only hopeless, but the existence of Austria is endangered.

Did Mr. Fox, in dissuading an active co-operation on the continent, recommend any other efficient measure in its stead?—The only suggestion he offered, was the vague and nugatory plan of a general congress. "Offer," said he, "at once the most reasonable terms. France will either accept them, or, by her refusal, she will draw on herself the indignation of Europe, in a degree commensurate with your moderation." In reply, I ask, what will this avail you? Europe has been indignant for years at the aggressions of France. No new display of arrogance, no fresh violation of sacred treaties, were requisite to increase her sense of injury. The independent powers had long complained, but the gate was barred to every demand of satisfaction. The cup of the bitterness of

Europe was full; but when she appealed to Bonaparte, the substance of his replies were, "You shall drain it to the dregs, and you shall not even remonstrate."

Mr. Fox, therefore, opposed a continental coalition, without offering any effectual substitute. In the blindness of his predilection for peace, he forgot that, with so domineering a neighbour as France, the only chance for obtaining permanent tranquillity is in vigorous war. In depreciating the importance of an alliance with Russia and Austria, he differed not only from all the leading men on both sides, but with that inconsistency which has frequently marked his conduct, he differed from himself. In June, 1805, he says, "I will refuse my sanction to any subsidy to Russia, even if leagued with Austria." But in May, 1803, so highly did this *profound* statesman estimate the influence of Russia and the condescension of Bonaparte, that he exclaimed, "I ask any one who has attended to the affairs of the continent, whe-

ther he thinks that France, if she saw Great Britain and Russia firmly united against her, would not be *appalled* into justice and moderation."

Our author occupies nearly ten pages in treating of the imprudence of commencing hostilities before the disposition of Prussia was ascertained. He comments on the changes of disposition in that power, and on her apparent hostility to the confederacy at the commencement of the operations. While he acknowledges that our documents on this important subject are *peculiarly defective*, he adopts a decided tone throughout, on a subject, in many respects, involved in mystery. This is neither a candid procedure, nor likely to lead to a true result. Let us, in availing ourselves of the scanty materials afforded by the official papers, combine with these an attentive consideration of circumstances and events. This mode of reasoning will be found more favourable to the attainment of impartial conclusions on a most

interesting topic, than the plan adopted in the Inquiry, which appears to recognize no arguments unless those which have a tendency to censure the conduct of the allies."

Had the allies deemed the assistance of Prussia essential to the success of the coalition, and relied on obtaining it, such confidence in a power whose policy has long been either wavering, or favourable to France, would have been extremely injudicious. It appears, however, from the whole tenor of the official documents, that they neither reckoned upon her accession to the league, nor considered her co-operation necessary for their success. But although they neither calculated on her alliance, nor viewed it as indispensible, it is probable they entertained hopes that in consequence of the league, Prussia would be reanimated to a sense of what she owed to her own safety and to the interest of Europe. That these hopes were not without foundation, may not only be presumed

from a just view of her own situation, but is made apparent by the promptitude with which she assumed a hostile attitude to France immediately after the violation of the territory of Anspach, from the known disposition of her Minister Hardenberg, and from the influence of Russia at Berlin —an influence of which it is difficult to describe the nature or extent, but which appears from its effects to have been very powerful.

Of the hostility of Prussia the allies had no reason to be afraid. She had continued neutral since 1794, during a series of campaigns in the heart of Germany. Even when Austria fought alone, Prussia could not be induced by France to a departure from her favourite system. Much less would the arguments of France have availed, when Russia not only favoured the cause of Austria, but had become a principal in the war. Russia is not only the immediate and most formidable neighbour of Prussia; but I have the authori

of the writer of the Inquiry himself when I state, that the provinces of Polish Prussia are a constant subject of anxiety to the Court of Berlin; and that Russia, without incurring risk to herself, may at any time excite them to revolt. There is therefore no danger that the Cabinet of Berlin will hazard a war with that of St. Petersburg. With a view to the maintenance of peace in Germany, she interdicted, in the first instance, the passage of her territories to the Russians. But she had communicated a similar injunction to the French. This, therefore, was no act of hostility to the allies, but a demonstration of neutrality.

In urging the importance of the accession of Prussia to the league, our author maintains, that "without her co-operation, every chance of ultimate success was against the allies; with her aid, it was scarcely possible their scheme could altogether fail." This declaration is by much too absolute. The success of a confederacy against France depends less upon the

number of its component members than upon the spirit which invigorates and the talents which direct. In a coalition of several powers, the accession of another conveys less additional strength than the numerical statement of her forces may suggest. In an alliance of Austria and Russia, the addition of 150,000 excellent troops to the armies at their disposal, would be an incalculable augmentation of force. Not so the co-operation of 150,000 Prussians, commanded hy different generals, actuated by distinct views, and acting on a remote part of the theatre of the war. In multiplying allies, you lose the benefit of unity of action, you incumber your plans, you delay yonr operations. Russia is to Austria a most valuable ally, not only from the magnitude of her power but from her disinterested views. Too distant from France to have any object in territorial acquisitions in the theatre of the war, she makes that disposition of her troops which Austria recommends. She renders their operations subservient, not

to the acquisition of a particular province, but to the general purposes of the league. Prussia, on the other hand, is possessed of territories near the seat of war, and desirous of making conquests for herself. Instead, therefore, of generously contributing her whole force to the common object of the league, she will direct her operations to the attainment of points conducive to her own views. An army of 50,000 men may be thus detained for months, in the siege of a fortress, garrisoned by one-fourth of their numbers, while the enemy throw the mass of their troops, in irresistible force, in a different direction. Had Prussia been, from the beginning of the campaign, an active member of the coalition, the scenes of her operation would naturally have been Hanover, Westphalia, and ultimately Holland. According to their usual policy, the French would have left in these countries scarcely any more regular troops than were necessary to garrison the fortresses. The chief part of their force would have

been withdrawn to attempts of daring enterprise towards the centre of the war. The sieges of Hameln, and of the fortified towns in Holland, would have long occupied the Prussians. During this precious interval, the French would have made a diligent and effectual use of their troops in a different quarter. And it would have been conformable to their system to have brought back, on the approach of winter, large bodies into Brabant and Flanders, and to have attempted, by dint of an overpowering force, the recovery of the Prussian conquests.

However singular it may appear, the Austrians have been more successful in several campaigns without than with allies. In 1794, although aided by the Prussians, the English, and Dutch, they experienced nothing but disasters. Left alone in 1795, they obtained the most brilliant victories. The issue of the campaign of 1796, had it not been for the fatal talents of Bonaparte, would have been eminently successful. In

the memorable campaign of 1799, they repulsed the French in every direction, and met with no misfortune until the arrival of Korsakoff, with 30,000 Russians, induced the Archduke Charles to give an unfortunate extension to the theatre of operations.

These examples by no means prove that the accession of an ally confers no increase of strength, but they warn us against adopting the additional numbers as the rule of computation for the extent of actual assistance. The aid of 150,000 troops, so well disciplined as the Prussians, would be incalculable were they placed at the absolute disposal of the generalissimo of the coalition. But if they receive their orders from the Court of Berlin, we must make a most important deduction from their computed efficiency, in consequence of the distinction of their objects, and their distance from the central operations of the war.

The author of the Inquiry finds fault with Ministry "for not attempting to avail themselves of the favourable change produced in the sentiments of Prussia, by the violation of the territory of Anspach; in submitting the whole dispute to Prussian mediation at a time when France," he affirms, "would have listened to whatever came from Berlin; while the forces of Austria were not irreparably injured, and the armies of Russia were still unimpaired." In this instance, as in many others, our author's reasoning is at variance, not merely with probability, but with facts of public notoriety. The violation of the territory of Anspach took place on the 4th and 5th October; and in a week afterwards, by Mack losing the opportunity of retreat, his army was lost to Austria. The sentence I have quoted must have one of two meanings: Either "that Ministers ought to have acquired the knowledge of the violation of Anspach, procured the mediation of Prussia, and saved the Austrian army in a week,"

which is too absurd ever to have been in the contemplation of the author; or "that they should have obtained the Prussian mediation before the Austrian forces were otherwise injured than by Mack's surrender, and *while the armies of Russia were still unimpaired.*" Strange to tell, this explanation of the author's meaning is equally inconsistent with fact as the other with possibility; for before the Austrian force was otherwise injured than by Mack's surrender, before the Russians had fought at all, (except at Krems where they were victorious) Count Haugwitz *did* arrive in the French camp with offers of mediation, to which Bonaparte *refused to listen,* except on the terms he had already offered to Austria—terms equivalent to her absolute and unconditional submission.

Mediation is a favourite topic with our author. He seems disposed to recommend it on every occasion; and there is an obvious correspondence between his

views in this respect, and the strain of pacific sentiments expressed at all times by Mr. Fox in the House of Commons. It is important, however, to observe, that the French are still more formidable in negotiation than in the field; and the history of Europe since 1792 offers a series of proofs of the fatal effects of armistices and treaties. Their object in making these is not to conclude an equitable peace, but to gain time, to divide allies from each other, to effect separate negotiations, and always to avoid treating with a confederacy. Even in the latter case, if obliged to treat with several powers at the same time, all the chances of success from diplomatic artifice are in favour of France. In the progress of the negotiation, she will calculate on detaching one at least of the allied courts from the league. In regard to the duration of the conferences, as she is under no necessity to consult any other power, she may make it as long or as short as suits her purpose. She may at one period gain time, by inducing false

expectations of a conceding disposition, or she may proclaim a sudden rupture, if she consider her forces in a state of preparation to anticipate the allies. Upon the violation of the territory of Anspach, Prussia with one hand unsheathed the sword, and with the other, opened the path to amicable negotiation. Our ministry then dispatched Lord Harrowby to secure her in the interest of the league. The chief object of his mission was probably a liberal overture of subsidy, if she would join her forces to the common cause. Had ministers omitted so important a measure, or had they confined themselves, as the author of the Inquiry recommends, to soliciting her mediation, what a torrent of abuse would have been poured upon them by the Opposition! They would have been told that a confederacy is formidable only in the field—that in negotiation it loses not only its energy, but the chance of its existence—that when a coalition has been formed, the only just policy is to proceed to im-

mediate action—that when a great power indicates a disposition to accede to a league, the most decisive measures should be adopted to procure her immediate co-operation in the field—and that ministers, by confining their application to Prussia, at such a crisis, to the solicitation of her mediatory offices, had lost the only moment for the redemption of Europe—a moment which would never return.

The writer of the Inquiry next censures the British government for allowing the command in chief to be intrusted to General Mack. I agree with him that this choice was singularly injudicious, but the interference of our Cabinet could not have prevented his nomination. The same blind predilection in the Court of Vienna which led to his appointment, would have persisted in his choice. An ally may interpose in the election of a commander for a particular service in which that ally is interested. Had the campaign proceeded as originally proposed, it is proba-

ble that that part of the Austro-Russian forces which would have been stationed to preserve the communication between the allies in Hanover and the grand armies in the South, would have been given to any officer the English Cabinet might have preferred; but to prescribe to Austria the nomination of the commander in chief of her forces, in the heart of her own empire, would have been an attempt not only fruitless but highly offensive to a great state.

The Austrian plan of operations was very judiciously drawn, and has been generally ascribed to Mack, with the qualification that he was skilful to combine but unfit to execute. After misconduct, however, so glaring and inexcusable as that of last year, combined with his former errors, it is inconsistent to allow him any skill but that of intrigue, or any art except that of impressing others with a notion of his ability. It is very extraordinary that a man of such contemptible

parts should have been so long in favour at the Court of Vienna. No individual has contributed more to the success of France, and to the degradation both of his own country and of Europe. It is very probable that his influence with Prince Coboug in 1792 and 1793 counteracted that vigorous plan of warfare which the genius of Clairfait would have recommended, and which, when he became commander in chief, he so gloriously exemplified. In 1799, Mack was sent to Naples, and in a few months entirely lost the army intrusted to him. Finally, in 1805, he is placed at the head of one of the finest armies ever sent into the field, and in six weeks he delivered it into the possession of the enemy.

Our author proceeds to state, that a grand error was committed by the Austrians in passing the Inn, and carrying the war at once into Bavaria before the Russians were near to support them. The influence of England, he adds, should have

interfered to "modify the plan of the campaign, and prevent the violation of the Bavarian neutrality."

To suppose that Austria would pay any attention to the suggestions of so distant a cabinet as our's, in regard to her operations in Bavaria is almost as extraordinary as to believe that our Admiralty would send to Vienna for instructions for the channel fleet. Passing by this charge as undeserving either of the author's attention or of mine, I shall proceed to a more interesting topic——the consideration of what should have been the conduct of Austria to Bavaria. This question will involve reflexions on some of those grand causes which decide the fate of battles and the issue of campaigns—a subject most important in itself, and essential to a disquisition of this nature, but on which it does not appear from the Inquiry that its author has bestowed the attention it deserves.

The conduct of Austria to Bavaria ought to have been similar to that of the King of Prussia to Saxony in 1756. That vigilant prince foresaw the approach of a war, in which he had reason to believe that his neighbour was concerned—he therefore took immediate possession of his country. The connexion between Bonaparte and the Elector of Bavaria was notorious. The electoral house is the hereditary enemy of the house of Austria. When his troops have fought under its banners, it has been the effect, not of cordiality but of necessity. The known duplicity of the Elector not only justified but necessitated the promptest measures. The obvious policy of Austria was, therefore, as soon as she judged hostilities inevitable, to invade Bavaria with a very numerous army, to over-run it with the greatest celerity, to disarm every electoral soldier, and to strip the treasury of its last dollar, not with the mean intention of finally retaining the money, but to deprive the Elector of the means of ful-

filling his perfidious engagements with France.

The invasion of Bavaria took place on the 7th September. The time appears to have been well chosen, as it was exactly the period at which Bonaparte ceased to entertain all ideas of peace, and to prepare with energy for war. While the main body of the Austrians passed the Inn, a division under General Klenau was ordered to advance by forced marches to Neuburg on the Danube, to cut off the retreat of the Bavarians into Franconia. Hitherto all was well managed, and the electoral army, it was probable, would soon have been surrounded, when the credulous Mack listened to the treacherous negotiations of the Elector and countermanded Klenau's march, at a time when the progress of the Austrians against Bavaria should not have been suspended an hour, by night or by day, except for the purposes of indispensible refreshment to the

troops. The consequence of the Elector's falsehoods, and of Mack's simplicity, was the safe retreat of the Bavarians to meet the French at Wurtzburg.

To have communicated the intended league to a power so intimately connected with France as Bavaria, in the expectation of gaining her over to the alliance, would have been the height of folly. Instead of treating the Elector with more delicacy, as the author of the Inquiry recommends, the great error was in showing him too much, and in suspending operations for a moment upon the pledge of so faithless a prince.

Although to invade Bavaria and disarm her troops was the undoubted policy of Austria, it by no means follows that the campaign should have been opened on the Iller. Wherever it was opened, the duty of the Austrian commander was unquestionably to retire upon the approach of the French, until he should have been joined

by the Russians. The plains of Suabia and Bavaria offered to the Austrians every advantage for retreat—here were no defiles or mountains to impede their retrograde march, or enable the enemy to cut off even detachments. It was not requisite to fight at all, unless perhaps some actions between the cavalry, a description of force in which the Austrians are far superior. That Mack should not have adopted so obvious a measure would justify the suspicion of treachery or madness, were we not assured, by fatal experience, that his intellects are of the meanest class.

Our author proceeds to explain the importance of Switzerland in an offensive war against France, and to insist on the impropriety of Austria acceding to the neutrality of that republic. I agree with him in regard to the importance of that country, and that it is in vain to think of assailing France elsewhere with effect, But it must be apparent to whoever has read the official papers, that although Aus-

tria acceded to the demand of the Cantons as long as Bonaparte should respect their neutrality, she was fully impressed with the advantages of carrying the war through Switzerland, into Franche Compté. It was evident, however, that until the whole of the Russian force should have arrived, there was no probability of the operations of the allies being sufficiently successful or extensive to justify the expectation of carrying the war into Switzerland. To have refused, therefore, to acknowledge the neutrality of Switzerland, would have been to have declared to France, from the beginning, the plan of the campaign—a declaration not only most imprudent but wholly unnecessary, for the chances were a hundred to one that before the allies could have penetrated to the neighbourhood of Switzerland, the French, agreeable to all former and reeent example, would have of themselves violated its neutrality.

If it be argued that Austria ought not

to have made any calculation on the probable conduct of the French, but to have declared from the beginning her determination to make Switzerland the theatre of war, although such declaration was neither prudent or necessary, I answer, that if such conduct be dignified, it is not wise; and that the simplicity it would discover, would at once unfit Austria to be the adversary of a power who is incapable of good faith, and whose whole policy is a system of fraud and falsehood.

The next object of our author's animadversion, is the conduct of the British ministry in the mode of our co-operation. He begins by blaming the expedition to Hanover, when a diversion might have been effected either in Holland or the north of France. To this the answer is obvious. By sending our troops to Holland, or the north of France, we should have exposed them to speedy destruction. What chance of success could attend a

detached force in the heart of an enemy's country, remote not only from the assistance, but even the communication of our allies? By sending our troops to Hanover they formed, in conjunction with the Swedes and Russians, an efficient army; and had not fortune so unexpectedly proved adverse to Austria, they would have assailed Holland in the only quarter in which her frontiers are open to attack.

Boulogne now becomes the subject of our author's attention; and he censures government because, when the French were conceived to have withdrawn their troops, they made no attempt against the flotilla. In a work professedly founded on official documents, and written in a style superior to common pamphlets, it is extraordinary to see the adoption of so vulgar an error as the eligibility of an attack, last autumn, upon Boulogne. "Expeditions of descent are, of all operations

in war," says a very intelligent author*, "the most difficult and dangerous. To all the fortuitous accidents of war, are joined those of the seasons, the weather, and the sea." The batteries of Boulogne are of such strength that they may be defended by a very small number, compared with the force of the assailants. What proof have we that all the veteran troops were at any time withdrawn, and the defence intrusted to new levies? How absurd is it to suppose that such a master in the art of war as Bonaparte should leave this, the most important of all his stations, inadequately protected. And even had there been a reasonable expectation of success, would our government have been justified in wasting on an object purely English, those forces which our engagements with our allies, and the common cause of Europe, called to the scene of combined operation?

* Character of European Armies.

He proceeds to find fault with government for accompanying the pensions to Swiss officers, with a stipulation that they should not reside in their own country. If government required the condition of non-residence, I must conclude, until the contrary be proved, that this measure was suggested by substantial reasons—especially when I perceive that the arguments advanced in the Inquiry, to censure, in this respect, the conduct of government, are fallacious. Let us briefly examine them.

The author describes the Swiss officers in our pay as "panting after the moment when their rage against France might once more shew itself at the head of their peasantry," and that "had they been allowed to receive their pensions at home, the means would have been prepared of rousing the whole Alps, from Constance to the Rhone, in hostility to France, as soon as the war should break out."

I reply to this elegant declamation, that the Swiss officer, embarked in foreign service, is not actuated by those generous feelings which our author so liberally attributes to him. He discharges his duty with exemplary fidelity, but he follows his profession, not for the honour but for the profit it affords. He feels no other attachment to England, to Holland, or to France, than on account of the pay he receives. On the contrary, the general disposition of men in foreign service, is a habit of invidious contrast between the country of their temporary adoption and their own. In case of Switzerland becoming the theatre of war, the Swiss officer who might be resident there, and in the receipt of a pension from England, would obey her summons to repair to the standard of her allies, and would discharge his duty in the field as a man of honour. But if it be expected that he will be zealous beyond the line of military duty, and that he "pants," as our author presumes, to excite

his countrymen to active hostility against the French, and in favour of the allies, the deception will be egregious. The prevailing sentiment in Switzerland is indeed a hatred of the French; but this sentiment has not yet led to a predilection for any foreign power. The inhabitants of this once happy republic are strongly attached to their country and to independence; and were not the attempt hopeless, they would generously brave every danger in a struggle between Switzerland and France. But it will be difficult to convince them that the invasion of their country by foreign armies will be the means of restoring its liberty.

So slender is the basis on which our author would have depended for "rousing the whole Alps from Constance to the Rhone in hostility to France." He "words it well;" but if you attempt to seize the substance, it will fleet, like a shadow, from the grasp.

——frustra comprensa manus effugit imago,
Par levibus ventis, volucrique simillima somno.

Were Mr. Fox, in the event of a new war, to make any reliance on opposing the arms of Bonaparte by means so inefficient as these, his campaigns would be the counterpart of Mack's, and we might prepare ourselves for fresh disasters as fatal as those of Ulm.

Our author proceeds to ascribe to ministers the delay which occurred in the sailing of our expedition to Hanover. With his accustomed confidence of assertion, he insists that "we were still less prepared than our allies," and "that we took the means to defeat as far as possible the utility, and narrow the chance of success of our expedition." If the author was unacquainted with the real cause of the delay, his negligence in inquiry is reprehensible. If he knew it, and affected ignorance, the charge is more serious, and it would not be amiss to remind him of the *temperate* language of his patron, Mr. Fox, to the opponent whom he considers capable of wilful misrepresentation. The real cause

of the delay of the expedition was the prevalence of a strong north-east wind, from September till the middle of November. The armament was ready long before their sailing took place, and the same cause of detention prevented, for more than six weeks, a homeward-bound West India fleet from coming round from Portsmouth to London. Does our author mean to make Ministers responsible for the state of the winds? or will he ascribe wilful negligence to our merchants, on account of a delay of which there had been no example for fourteen years?

In one respect, however, I correspond in opinion with him—in the impropriety of landing an army in Naples. This measure was obviously the wish of Russia, but it effected no diversion, and was consequently an unavailing mode of employing twenty thousand men.

The author of the Inquiry proposes two alternatives for the disposal of these troops;

either to have disembarked them in the Venetian territory, and placed them under the command of the Archduke Charles, which would have been the proper plan; or to have landed them in Lombardy, in order to hang upon Massena's rear. To land in Lombardy would indeed be a difficult operation, for Lombardy has no sea-coast. But our author's meaning, no doubt, is, that while the Archduke made head against Massena's army in front, the English and Russians should have been landed in the north of Italy, and marched to Lombardy to hang upon Massena's rear. After making such a proposition, the author must forego his claims to the reputation of judgment in tactics. The disembarked army must either have confined its operations, with a view to its own safety, within such narrow limits, as to enable it to regain the shipping when threatened by superior numbers; a scheme so adverse to all efficient hostility, that I cannot consider it as having entered into the contemplation of an intelligent writer:

or, the author's idea must have been, that the English and Russians should have advanced, with decided resolution, into that part of the interior where it was judged they could most effectually annoy the enemy. This plan, although apparently vigorous, would have been a renewal of the disastrous system of last war, in acting with divided forces against a bold and active enemy, whose greatest successes have been obtained by a rapid and skilful concentration of numbers. Twenty thousand Russians and English would thus have been placed behind Massena, whose army was not over-rated at seventy thousand. They could have had no direct communication with the Archduke, and, in the event of attack from superior numbers, he could have afforded them no support; for it is highly improbable that he should have received intelligence of their danger, until the season of relief was past. Massena's army was composed of men in the prime of life, many of whom had marched in 1797, at the rate of thirty miles a day,

to destroy, on the same fatal scene, an Austrian force, detached and unsupported in consequence of the adoption of the unwise system recommended by the author of the Inquiry. This idea is equally judicious with his proposal to disembark the British troops in Holland, or the north of France. In either case, speedy and inevitable ruin would have ensued. The system of the French is to accumulate, by sudden movements, a mass of force, in order to overpower any detached body of their enemies. And in both instances, the author of the Inquiry recommends exactly that plan which will throw our troops into their hands.

The Second Part of the Inquiry relates to the consequences of our late foreign policy. The author begins by expatiating on the value of the cessions made by Austria to France. In speaking of Tyrol, he describes its loss as "of greater detri-

ment to Austria than her sacrifices in Italy, because it was invaluable as a barrier against the invasion of the hereditary states." He adds, that "Tyrol, if properly managed, must always have been the main theatre of any war where Austria acted on the defensive." So erroneous is the whole of this reasoning, that the misfortunes of the Austrians have generally proceeded from acting in mountainous countries. It is this mode of warfare in which the French surpass them, and are always eager to engage. The French are not only superior in the agility and intelligence requisite for operations in hilly countries, but the nature of the ground prevents their adversaries from making use of their excellent cavalry. The Austrians must not put their trust in mountains or defiles; they must summon their enemy to combat in the open plain—to the pitched battle—to the charge of the bayonet—to the deadly encounter of the sabre. Let the numbers be equal, and the commander

of the Austrians a Suwarrow or a Clairfait, and the issue will not long be doubtful.

After a florid enumeration of the advantages of Italy, our author adds, "All these are now in the hands of the nation in the world best able to improve them, to combine them, to make them aid one another; and after calling them forth to the incalculable augmentation of her former resources, ready to turn them against those, if any such shall remain, who still *dare* to be her enemies." This impartial writer does not then consider it necessary to notice, in a description of Italy, the hatred universally entertained in that country against the French; the obstacles to improvement from the prejudices, the indolence, the cowardice of its inhabitants, or from the headstrong and injudicious nature of Bonaparte's civil administration—his own tyranny—the rapacity of his officers — the embezzlement of the public property in every department of the French government, and a general system

of arrogance, of rapine and oppression, which condemns to misery the inhabitants of this delightful country, and imposes silence by the bayonet on the just complaints of the victims of oppression.

The conclusion of the sentence I have quoted is unworthy of a Briton. Can a citizen of this free and powerful nation be doubtful whether any countries shall remain who still *dare* to be the enemies of France? Are Britain and Russia then so degraded and intimidated that they shall not presume even to take up arms? Is their strength so exhausted, and their spirit sunk so low, that no alternative remains but to receive, in silent submission, the dictates of the enemy? of an enemy who acknowledges no law but his own will, no appeal but to the sword?

> Impiger, iracundus, inexorabilis, acer
> Jura negat sibi nata, nihil non arrogat armis.

I must submit to the painful task of exposing to the indignation they deserve,

several similar expressions in the publication under review. They are unworthy of a member of a free commonwealth, and, how much more, of a mind enlightened by the envied gifts of literature! In mentioning that since last campaign, the prospect of the deliverance of Holland, Switzerland, and Italy, is much lessened, the author concludes, "They have England to thank for this reverse of prospects, and it is probably the last favour they will receive at her hands." In a few pages further he says, speaking of the continental war, and of the dread of invasion, "We have purchased a miserable respite from our alarms; for, in spite of our boasting, we were the dupes of our fears." Again, when adverting to the picture he has drawn of the state of the nation, he adds, "It is our misfortune that we look around in vain for any circumstances which may soften its features, while it is impossible to imagine any addition which may aggravate them." And he recommends to offer equitable terms of peace, "in order to ob-

tain, for *the first time*, the favourable character of moderation and pacific dispositions."

How false and treacherous are these assertions! By what fatality is a writer of such talents impelled, instead of accusing a party, to insult the nation? Mr. Fox, in giving an avowed sanction to so unguarded a production, belies his reputation for manly and liberal conduct, and justifies all the censures which have passed on him for imprudence. In the heat of debate, a generous audience will forgive the incautious expressions which have so frequently marked his speeches. But the invectives in the performance under examination are gratuitous. They have been provoked by no aggression—they are justified by no hostility. Composed by the author in the leisure of the closet, and revised at the office of his patron, the injury they inflict is deliberate and wanton. The chief object of their acrimony is an illustrious

statesman, now beyond the reach of human censure; and with a blind eagerness to condemn his measures, the Inquiry before us transfers its reproaches from Mr. Pitt to the country for whose cause his life was devoted.

Not content with extolling the value of the countries lost to Austria by the last campaign, the author dwells upon the balance produced in favour of the conquerors beyond the mere changes of territory. "Defeat," he says, "has caused humiliation in the Austrians, and victory a corresponding elevation in the French." However the French may be animated by success, he ill appreciates the firmness of the Austrian character who represents that brave people as crushed, because they have been unfortunate. The Austrian soldier knows neither intimidation nor despondency; he will not forsake the field until ordered by his commander, and he meets death with a firmness peculiar to himself. Equal constancy actuates the

nation in their attachment to their sovereigns. With such subjects what may not the Cabinet of Vienna accomplish if guided by enlightened views? The weakness of Austria has confessedly been only in her government. The severe lessons of misfortune have a powerful tendency to eradicate abuses. Such perhaps were the errors in the Imperial administration, that adversity alone could effect their cure. Its salutary effects are already apparent. The Archduke Charles is raised to the supreme direction of military affairs—a general enrolment for acquiring the use of arms is stated to have taken place. These wholesome provisions justify the expectation of still greater improvements: they tend to promote the introduction of a wise system of policy in every department of this extensive empire. The loss of Venice and Tyrol will be compensated by the acquisition of a species of strength far more solid and effective; and Austria, when the wisdom of her government shall equal the energy of her subjects, and the

resources of her dominions, may with confidence appeal to arms, in vindication of her own rights and of the cause of Europe.

The next remarks in the Inquiry relate to the increased danger of invasion. I view these in a very different light from the rest of the work, and I have accordingly made them the subject of a separate discussion.

The author proceeds to accuse Ministry of having made no use of the interval of security from invasion, to effect a reform of our defensive measures. He neither indicates distinctly the plan of amelioration he requires, nor gives any explicit reason why that was the proper season for its adoption. He mentions indeed, that we were then exempt from the apprehension of invasion; but in that circumstance there was nothing novel, for two winters had already elapsed since the beginning of the war, and every reflecting

man must be aware that, during that season, the danger from Boulogne is infinitely lessened. The best apology the author can make for this awkward argument is, that at the time he urged it, he could not foresee that Mr. Fox would be in office for several months without passing a single act to remedy those defects, for which he had so loudly reproached his predecessor; that a principal feature in his measures of military improvement should be the inefficient scheme of an armed peasantry; and that the whole plan should be inadequate equally to the expectations of the country, and to the splendid promises of radical amelioration held out by himself and his friends, before coming into power.

We have now reviewed a large proportion of the Inquiry: we have seen the author attack almost every measure of

Ministry since the prorogation of last session. He adopts the strain of unqualified disapprobation formerly pursued by the Right Hon. Secretary: he commences where Mr. Fox ceased, and he rivals him in asperity of abuse; perhaps also he may dispute with his patron the palm of inconsistent and erroneous assertion.

Not satisfied with so liberal an effusion of censure, the author deems it necessary to revert to circumstances antecedent to the late coalition. In this, as in former parts of the Inquiry, we are presented with a fluent series of arguments deduced from the most fallacious views. He dwells on the probability of our having been able to procure the accession of Spain to a general league, when it is notorious that since 1796 the Court of Madrid has been blindly devoted to France. After expending every epithet of reprehension on the imprudence of Austria and Russia in attacking France, he affects to consider the hostility of Spain, on the side of the Py-

renees, as likely to be extremely hurtful to that powerful neighbour. The immense subsidies paid to France by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, as the price of the neutrality of Spain, he denominates a *trifling* aid. But the most extraordinary of his assertions is, that " if unfortunately we preferred hostilities, we should have taken care to make the war as advantageous as possible, by liberating the Spanish colonies from the galling monopoly of the mother-country, and opening a most profitable inlet for our commercial speculations." This profound politician would then recommend it as judicious to waste the lives of our seamen and soldiers, in attempts to conquer settlements in the fatal atmosphere of the Spanish main. He considers that commerce as likely to be *most profitable,* which, even in the event of conquest, we should have to carry on in a country without law, and with a race of men devoid of principle. Let him permit me to inform him that the evil of our West India acquisitions is their being

and the landmen of her navy. Even the seamen, whether in the public or private shipping, are not in general native Dutchmen, but from the north of Germany, from Denmark and Sweden. Of the men who fought off Camperdown, and so bravely maintained the former fame of Holland, only a small proportion were Dutch. With respect to the army, Guelderland, a province comparatively inconsiderable, is the only source of supply. There exists not a nation more destitute of military habits, or possessing less aptitude to acquire them. If the writer of the Inquiry believes that from a greater dread of the horrors of internal war than of their present subjection, they would rise in active opposition to an invading foe, he is egregiously mistaken. The Dutch, whatever be their expectations from a force sent to deliver them, or whatever the tyranny of their oppressors, will act a neutral part. Individual safety is a Dutchman's object; and from that, no consideration, except downright compulsion, can make him de-

part. They are divided into two parties, apparently so equal in numbers and influence, that it is a matter of extreme difficulty to decide which of the two really possesses that superiority which is claimed by both. The highest and lowest classes are in general devoted to the Orange family, while the middle ranks constitute the popular party. The former are attached to the French; the latter, as far as commercial jealousy will allow, to the English. This division has subsisted nearly two hundred years. Its spirit is hereditary, imbibed from the earliest period of life, and retained with the characteristic pertinacity of the Dutch. So rooted is attachment to the Orange family in the minds of its adherents, that while that House possesses a representative, no succession of revolutions, no variety of new constitutions, will eradicate it from their breasts. Yet such are the habits and disposition of the people, that, notwithstanding this strong predilection, no active co-operation in the work of their deliverance is to be

expected from them. In 1794, when the French approached their frontier, and threatened the overthrow of all that was dear to the Orange party, there was made no exertion of individual patriotism—no voluntary levies—no pecuniary subscriptions. The hired troops of the Republic (Swiss and Germans) were left to fight, unaided, the battles of the state. In 1799, when the successes of the campaign had been entirely on the side of the allies, and the Prince's party had the strongest motives, from the prospect of success, as well as congeniality of feeling, to co-operate with the invading army, it is notorious that they afforded not the smallest assistance.

The republican party partakes equally of the national apathy. Their leaders, however, have the benefit of whatever movement can be communicated to this languid mass by the machine of government. In 1795, after the French invasion, a number of the citizens attached to the democratic side were formed into volunteer corps.

These, in the event of invasion, would *be marched* out against the assailing force. They would take the field from the necessity of obeying orders; but although numerous, they are so inefficient in a military view, that I do not under-rate the measure of their exertion, when I state that the addition of 5000 regular soldiers to the invading army would be an adequate provision against the whole annoyance to be expected from the collective body of Dutch volunteers.

My reasoning on the subject of Holland has not hitherto materially varied from that of the author of the Inquiry. We differ in the mode of deduction, but approximate in the result. In what remains, however, of this branch of the subject, we are most widely in opposition. He appears very imperfectly acquainted with the actual state of Holland; and it is important that his inferences should be investigated with care.

In treating of the Dutch commerce, his language conveys a belief, that, although not equally extensive, it continues in other respects in the same busy and prosperous state as in the better days of the Republic. Nothing can be more fallacious. A war with England is the signal for the Dutch flag to disappear from the ocean. Their West-India colonies fall an easy conquest to our arms, and their trade with the East, formerly the pride of Holland and admiration of the universe, is carried on by the limited and hazardous system of neutral flags. That portion of intercourse which they still maintain with other countries in Europe, is transacted in the same precarious manner. Their internal trade and manufactures are in a state of correspondent decay, and the whole country is undergoing a most serious diminution, not only of wealth, but of population.

Of this diminution our author appears to have been aware; but he recollects also to have read, as a principle in political econo-

my, that the profits of stock increase as its total amount in a society is lessened. He not only applies this principle to the present state of Holland, but deduces from it a conclusion, which, in its present unqualified shape, conveys an impression altogether contrary to the actual condition of that unhappy country. I quote his own words:

"In fact, the accounts of the Dutch oppressions are greatly exaggerated. Many capitalists have been ruined and forced to emigrate. Many persons have had their wealth diminished, and the whole riches of the state are greatly impaired; but the profits, which are still drawn upon the remaining stock, are necessarily higher; *and this of itself tends to alleviate the burdens of the capitalists who are left behind.*"

The general principle here introduced is illustrated in book Ist, chapter IXth, of that invaluable work, the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. It is thus ex-

pressed: "The diminution of the capital stock of the society, or of the funds destined for the maintenance of industry, as it lowers the wages of labour, so it raises the profits of stock, and consequently the interest of money." Dr. Smith quotes in support of this principle, the great fortunes suddenly acquired in the *ruined* countries of Bengal and the other British settlements in the East Indies.

This principle is not to be denied, and receives, in fact, an exemplification from the state of Holland. It was easy formerly to borrow money there at an interest of four per cent.; at present, it is nearly impossible to procure it at five. But the deduction of the author of the Inquiry, that the increased profit of stock tends to alleviate the burdens of the capitalists left behind, is most erroneous, if we are to take it in the natural meaning of the words, that the profit on capital having become greater, the whole income of the capitalist has increased. This does not result from

the general principle, and it is fully disproved by the actual condition of Holland.

The diminution of stock in all societies is attended with the most ruinous consequences to the country at large. The capitalist sustains his share in the general calamity: he obtains a higher rate of interest, but his capital is less secure: he therefore dares not in prudence either lend or employ the whole. The hazards of trade are multiplied by the increased number of failures. He suffers from this cause directly, if he trade himself; or indirectly through the instability of his debtors, if he lend his capital to others: he therefore does not employ the whole, either in trade or upon loan. Upon the invasion of Holland by the French, a large proportion of capital was hoarded. The practice of hoarding indicates a situation the reverse of prosperous, both in the individual and in the country. By a total loss of profit therefore on a part of his stock, the capitalist, notwithstanding the increased rate of in-

terest on the remainder, derives much less income from his whole property in times of public calamity.

In speaking of Bengal, Dr. Smith mentions, "that the great fortunes so suddenly and so easily acquired in it, and the other British settlements in the East Indies, may satisfy us, that as the wages of labour are very low, so the profits of stock are very high in those ruined countries. The interest of money is proportionably so. In Bengal money is frequently lent to the farmers at forty, fifty, and sixty per cent." If this was the state of India thirty or forty years ago, it is now materially altered. The usual interest of money is at present from ten to twelve per cent. The fortunes said to have been made in that country, have, both in Dr. Smith's days and our own, been much over-rated. If their origin be investigated, it will be found more frequently in the official situation of the individual in the Company's service, than in the legitimate profits of trade. They have

generally been acquired by men who were strangers equally to the principles and the habits of commerce: *presents from the natives,* or the possession of monopolies, will be found in the history of British India to have been a more fruitful source of fortune, than industry. The nature and progress of such requisitions have been regulated therefore by causes very different from the rules of political economy.

It must be apparent that the state of society in Bengal and Holland is extremely different. In Bengal, property was formerly very insecure, and trade confined to a small number. In Holland, property was sacred, and trade the universal occupation. No two countries can differ more widely in the gifts of nature. The fertile soil of Bengal supplies with the returning season, a harvest abundant both for the industrious husbandman and his rapacious master. But Holland, bereft of commerce, would lose that which alone renders her territory valuable. Her coast would be

reduced to a barren asylum for fishermen; her interior would become a dreary marsh.

The ruinous effects of diminished capital would therefore be infinitely more felt in Holland, where commerce was both so generally prosecuted, and so indispensable to the prosperity of the country. There, as in this and in every trading country, a great part of business was transacted upon credit. So important an instrument is credit in mercantile operations, that in many branches the amount of stock or capital ceases to be the criterion of the extent either of business or of profit. In this country a longer or shorter term is taken for the payment of almost every purchase, and credit is as essential to trade, in its present state, as the atmosphere to our existence. The Dutch, further advanced in their commercial career than the English, more abundant in money and less accustomed to speculative enterprise, transacted more business by immediate payments. But even in Holland,

credit was the soul of commerce. A foreign conquest, a revolution, but above all, their wars with England, have lessened exceedingly the mutual confidence of the merchants. By the interruption of her intercourse with the East and West Indies, Holland is deprived of the most extensive and lucrative branches of her trade. The ruin of almost all the public funds of Europe, except the British, is a fatal blow to a people who had lent out a large portion of their stock to foreign powers. Their internal trade suffers under a universal diminution of consumption. This complication of disasters has continued to press upon them for above ten years. Its consequences have been, the emigration of a large proportion of the population, and despondency in those who have remained. Peace alone can preserve to them what they still possess, and peace is the prayer of every Hollander. But in the present state of Europe there is no prospect of any pacification which can restore them to independence. It may pro-

cure a partial relief from their burdens, but it will confirm their degradation, and rivet the chains of French despotism.

The argument of the author of the Inquiry, that the increased profit of stock tends to alleviate the burdens of the capitalist, would have weight, provided taxation in Holland observed a uniform ratio to the amount or profit of stock. Their late taxes are indeed a very large ratio or per centage upon property; but this ratio is not uniform. It varies in different years; and instead of being more easily paid by the remaining capitalists in consequence of the ruin and emigration of their countrymen, its pressure is by that cause exceedingly augmented. The measure of taxation in Holland has long been, not a just regard to the means of its inhabitants, but the unavoidable necessities of the state. The French prescribe to them the maintenance of an extensive military and naval establishment, or the payment of a direct contribution to themselves: for these, and

the interest of their immense funded debt, provision *must* be made. It is therefore the amount of their burdens, not the ratio of taxation, which is certain. The ruin and emigration of a number of capitalists, and the consequent diminution of the national stock, increases very much the proportion of taxation on the remaining individuals. A sum, certain and of large amount, must be paid—the smaller the national property, the fewer the contributors, so much greater must be the ratio of contribution.

I have proved, I trust, that although, in the present calamitous state of Holland, the rate of interest is higher than formerly, the whole income of the capitalist is by no means increased. To maintain that the ruin and emigration of many capitalists is productive of effects tending to alleviate the burdens of those who remain, without taking any notice that the same causes produce other consequences tending in a much greater degree to aggravate their misery,

is an extraordinary mode of describing the situation of a country. The total relief afforded is one per cent. additional to the capitalist on *part* of his stock. Our author dwells on this advantage, but makes no mention that it can take place only under such circumstances of general distrust, that a considerable proportion of capital must remain at the same time unemployed; and that from the same causes the national despondency is so great, that this solitary advantage affords no substantial relief. It is a single ray of comfort sinking unperceived in the universal gloom.

To lend a sanction to a work so erroneous in these important points, is no slight imputation on the accuracy of the Right Hon. Secretary himself. It is whimsical to consider how he will be apostrophised on the perusal of such a doctrine, by the classes whom it affects. The political economist will exclaim, "You lately expressed a most extraordinary opinion, that you were very doubtful of the practical

application of general principles. In the present case you not only apply decidedly the general principle, but you counteract its operation." The merchant will say, "Your arguments are contradicted both by experience and common sense. To tell us that our burdens will be alleviated in consequence of failures and emigration, is equally judicious as to state that it is better to pay, instead of a moderate rate of income-tax, the enormous amount of ten per cent. at once."

To the doctrine of moderation and pacific disposition recommended in the publication under review, every man will subscribe. The difference will not be in regard to the admission of such principles while expressed in general terms, but in their application to particular circumstances. Until these circumstances are defined, to descant in general terms, is to say no more than that peace is preferable to war, and moderation to violence. Unquestionably every enlightened and liberal

mind, capable of appreciating the real causes of the prosperity of nations, will pronounce, that by a secure peace the interests of this country will be more effectually promoted, and its welfare more radically and permanently established, than by the most successful war: and if Mr. Fox succeed in negotiating a peace honourable to us and safe for the continent, he will deserve, not only the thanks of the country, but the forgiveness of all his inconsistencies.

Of such a peace, however, we have no flattering prospect. To act a condescending part in negotiation with so arrogant an enemy in Bonaparte, is to insure a renewal of hostility. Let it never be forgotten, that the treaty of Amiens, of which the chief recommendation was its having been made "in the spirit of peace," kept us, during the short interval of its duration, in a state of alarm worse than war. In any negotiation with Bonaparte, let Mr. Fox remember, that he is treating with the

most false and artful of men, with one who combines the most subtle mind with the most perfidious heart. He alternately oppresses by open violence, seduces by secret fraud, or assassinates in midnight obscurity.

——Ille venena
Colchica et quicquid usquam concipitur nefas,
Tractavit.

His system is to crush the weak, and beguile the powerful—to frighten the timid, and cajole the brave. The sword is the favourite engine of his government, and it is congenial to the turbulence of his temper. But he combines in his administration every species of support to himself, and of danger to his enemies. By the employment of enlightened men like Talleyrand, he makes even Philosophy administer her sacred aid to his lawless violence. He has reduced falsehood into a system, and adapts his lies with wonderful sagacity, to whatever character he addresses. He prevailed on the Cabinet of Vienna to acquiesce in his usurpations in Italy, by pre-

tending that they were necessary to enable him to re-establish with security, hereditary monarchy in France. With equal truth, he will endeavour to persuade Mr. Fox that he desires peace for the sake of alleviating the sufferings of mankind—that he has always admired pacific sentiments —that he has no wish to abridge the power of Britain, but that he is desirous to cultivate with her the most amicable relations, and to forget the evils of war in the innocent emulation of *commercial rivalship*.

We have now followed the author of the Inquiry through the greatest, and by far most important part of his work. We have seen that the prospect of France agreeing to a negotiation under the mediation of Russia, was extremely doubtful: and even had it been ostensibly adopted by Bonaparte, we could have entertained no hopes of the cordiality of his acceptance, or the

sincerity of his overtures: for he had scarcely agreed to the advances made by Russia, when, regardless of peace, he commits in the seizure of Genoa, an outrage replete with alarm, and declaratory of hostility to all Europe.

The pretended vagueness of the terms of the treaty of concert is best disproved by a reference to the treaty itself. The author's ignorance of the Dutch frontier will be apparent on a slight inspection of the map. Yet though thus imperfectly informed, he has no hesitation in passing unqualified censure on the statesmen who represented England and Russia in the conclusion of a treaty, whose object was the deliverance of Europe. The proper contents of a treaty, like that of St. Petersburg, is a declaration of its objects, and an outline of the means for their attainment. In both these respects, this treaty is equal in precision to any antecedent treaty entered into for the purpose of a general confederacy. Its objects are defined with

perspicuity, and it includes every provision which a treaty, contracted under such circumstances, could contain. Its result was a coalition far more powerful than any late confederacy against France. Europe, from the north to the south, seemed to rise up as one man against that overgrown power. She failed in her efforts by the infatuation of a General, who, in the first month of operation, lost to his Sovereign an army of 80,000 men.

The exemplary adherence of both Austria and Russia to the common cause affords a most satisfactory contradiction to the insinuations in the Inquiry. The fidelity of these powers justifies both the past confidence and the future hopes of Britain. Honour and courage are not always successful, but they are the best guardians of independence, and they offer a fair field of promise against a future period, when they may be called into exertion under more favourable circumstances.

The co-operation of Prussia is valuable; but it is not indispensable to the success of a confederacy against France. The allies do not appear to have reckoned on her assistance; but they had, in her own situation, the most satisfactory assurances that she would entertain no hostility against them.

It is a whimsical excess of crimination to accuse our Cabinet of the mistakes committed in conferences held between Russian and Austrian Generals in the heart of Germany, and of not having nominated the Commander in Chief of an army, where there was not a single British soldier, and of which we did not pay a third part. It is still more extraordinary to propose our Envoy at Vienna as a fit adviser for Generals in matters purely military. Mr. Adair might have adopted, but Sir Arthur Paget, we have no doubt, would have declined this innovation in diplomatic arrangement.

The necessity of insuring by treaties the co-operation of powers safe in their distance from France, before we called on Austria, her neighbour, to incur the formidable hazard of her hostility, is so obvious as to require no comment, unless it be on the ingenuity of the author of the Inquiry, who devises arguments for every case. Although facts and reason oppose him, he will not shrink from the encounter, but, like a true combatant, asserts the cause he has adopted under every disadvantage.

The invasion of Bavaria, so much condemned by our author, was a wise and vigorous measure. It failed through the credulity of Mack in exercising towards a faithless Prince too much of that confidence which the writer of the Inquiry so strenuously recommends.

Let him peruse again the Austrian plan of operations, and judge whether it was the intention of that Court to forego, in

the event of successful operations, the advantages of carrying the war into Switzerland—advantages which he has himself so fully and forcibly illustrated.

The sailing of our expedition to Hanover was delayed, not through the fault of Government, but by the continuance of contrary winds. The author censures the sending our forces to that Electorate, because the object was purely British; and in *the same page* he accuses Ministers of making no attempt upon Boulogne. Does he then mean, that to have attacked Boulogne would not have been an object purely British? And would it have been an evidence of disinterested policy, after arming the continent against France, to have confined our exertions exclusively to our own security?

To counsel an expedition against Boulogne, to demande the speedy conquest of Bavaria, to recommend the landing of bodies of British troops accordingly de-

tached and unsupported, in Holland, in the north of France, and in Lombardy, are propositions so radically erroneous as to prove a total ignorance of tactics in those who have composed this Inquiry. To a literary man, it is no reproach to have omitted to study a subject foreign to his usual pursuits; but why does Mr. Fox lend his sanction to a work replete with such fallacious views? The conclusion must be, that this far-famed statesman is unacquainted with the causes which decide the fate of battles and the issue of campaigns. When he relies on a defence so frail as an armed peasantry; when he countenances the recommendation of detached operations in the heart of the country of an enemy so fatally active as the French; and above all, when he makes light of the danger of invasion, without explaining the grounds of his security, except in vague and general terms, we are but too well justified to conclude, that he has neglected to give to these most important subjects the grave consideration

they demand, and that he has seen Europe shaken to her centre without investigating the causes of the awful convulsion.

It is a no less glaring error to assert, that the Austrians, by relinquishing Tyrol, have lost the best theatre of warlike operations. Mountains have been to them the scenes of reiterated disasters; their strength is in cavalry; and their wisest plan of warfare is to force the French to pitched battles.

In delineating the consequences of unsuccessful war, the author of the Inquiry views the question only on that side which suits his argument. With singular candour, he avoids taking any notice of the salutary reforms produced by the severe lessons of misfortune, and he describes as dejected and despondent a people who are strangers to intimidation.

The causes of our quarrel with Spain have been so amply discussed, and its necessity so fully demonstrated, that I have

confined myself to combating the absurd idea of acquisitions on the continent of America. The Spanish settlements would not be difficult of conquest, but success would to us be as fatal as discomfiture.

To Holland I have assigned a longer chapter. The real situation of that country, although contiguous to us, is very imperfectly known; and the Inquiry describes it in terms which could not fail to increase the previous misconceptions of the public.

I have already expressed surprise at the palpable errors in regard to tactics, in the high quarter which has patronized the present publication. An equal degree of ignorance in regard to trade, is apparent throughout. The commercial situation of Holland is as egregiously misunderstood as the nature of her frontier; and to recommend an attack on Spanish America with a view to profitable trade, betrays an equal unacquaintance with the nature of these

settlements, and of West India colonies in general.

To the author, or rather assistant author of this Inquiry, I will recommend a better task. By adopting the distorted views of party, he narrows the wide field which is the legitimate province of the philosophic mind. While he obtains the patronage of the Minister of the day, he relinquishes a fair claim to general and permanent approbation. Instead of being the apologist of a party, let him constitute himself the advocate of Britain against France, the vindicator of the cause of Europe against the arrogant tyrant who threatens to enslave her. If we can indulge the hope of a secure peace, let him exercise his talents in an inquiry into those conditions and that system which alone can insure permanent tranquillity. If this prospect be denied us, if Bonaparte refuse to acknowledge claims indispensable to our safety, and belie, as usual, his professions, it will then become an adequate object for the

talents of this writer to excite merited indignation against such insatiable ambition, to point out the nature and extent of our danger, and unfold those resources by which it may be successfully opposed.

Had the publication under review been even less directly sanctioned by Mr. Fox, its internal evidence would have bespoke its parentage. It is replete with those extremes, both in thought and language, which characterize his speeches. Like them, the Inquiry presents us with an accumulation of arguments in support of whatever idea is uppermost at the moment, without considering that the best means of refutation may be frequently found in this hasty assemblage. And, like his own career in public life, this work is an instructive exemplification of those inconsistencies which infallibly proceed from an ardent mind, unrestrained by caution and undisciplined by moderation.

Although Mr. Pitt's name is not mentioned in this publication, the whole attack, with the exception of Lord Grenville's share, is directed in substance against him. When the present confederacy, the greatest which for nearly a century had been formed against France, first developed its strength, the Opposition press loudly refused Mr. Pitt the merit of its formation; but since Mack's infatuation marred our fairest prospects, every epithet of censure has been cast upon that distinguished Minister. He is accused of not having exercised in foreign states an extent of power which a sovereign often finds difficult in his own kingdom — of not having controlled from London the operations in Bavaria. The faults of every court are ascribed to him, as if he had ruled Europe with despotic sway. Is it not obvious that England, remote from the theatre of war, must leave the conduct of military operations to the powers who are near them, whose force consists in armies, and

who are more immediately interested in the issue of the campaign than herself? Were she permitted to direct the movements of the league, what could ensue from her distance but delay and disaster? The province of the British Minister was therefore to employ the resources of his country to unite as large a part as possible of the commonwealth of Europe against its oppressor; to conciliate the jarring interests of those powers, and bind them together in a solid league, definite in its objects, and upright in its views; to conduct this arduous negotiation with secrecy, and by every possible precaution to avoid awakening the suspicion of a vigilant enemy; and finally, after having agreed upon a general plan of operations, to commit the detail to those who were to execute them, avoiding that interference in particular objects which involves the ruin of confederacies by the distraction of their views, and the division of their force.

In whatever way we examine the conduct of these important measures on the part of Mr. Pitt, we shall find the most solid grounds of approbation. The alliance was formidable in magnitude beyond example, the cordiality of its members has been evinced by their constancy under disaster, and the whole scheme was concealed from the enemy until the Russians were approaching to Germany. England therefore amply fulfilled her part in the coalition, and its failure was occasioned by causes beyond her controul.

The career of the illustrious Statesman we have lost, has been uniform; it was no less great in its close than promising in its commencement. The historian of his life will be under no necessity to call in to his panegyric the aid of eloquent or impassioned language: let him endeavour to elevate his mind to the conception of Mr. Pitt's views, to investigate his measures by their own merits, to weigh his mo-

tives and conduct in silent meditation, without attending to the reports either of friends or enemies, and he will pourtray a character equally admirable in all that enlightens the mind, and dignifies the heart.

STRICTURES

ON THE

CONDUCT

OF THE

PRESENT MINISTRY.

THE author of the Inquiry re-echoes the high encomiums on our present Administration, which were so lavishly bestowed on them when entering into office; but of which we every day hear less. He describes them as "uniting the largest portion of talents, experience, rank, and integrity; the most ample share of all the qualities, whether natural or acquired, intrinsic or accidental, which ever enabled a government to secure influence with its subjects, and command respect among foreign na-

tions." He subsequently adds, "No compromise of principles, no paltry half-measures, no incongruous mixture of big words and little doings, will bear them out in redeeming their pledge to save the country." Let us briefly examine how far their proceedings, since they came into office, have entitled them to the lofty description given of them by our author, have accorded with their own promises, or have fulfilled the expectations of the country.

1. Lord Ellenborough's appointment to a seat in the Cabinet. In an Administration composed of men who, on all occasions, had professed so great a jealousy of the executive power, and so firm an adherence to the rights of the people, above all to the impartial administration of public justice, the introduction of the Lord Chief Justice into the Cabinet was a step equally unexpected and inconsistent. To unite in one person functions so opposite as the judicial and executive, is repugnant equally to the provisions of our excellent consti-

tion, and to the first principles of justice. The impropriety of the measure was compensated by no countervailing advantage, it was required by no imperious necessity. Already fully occupied by most laborious duties, his Lordship can devote no adequate portion of his time to political avocations. Advanced to the summit of his profession, and enjoying its highest honours, his dignity does not require this adventitious distinction.

Besides, the study of law is not the school of politics. The best pleaders of the present day, whether distinguished for animated oratory, or depth of legal knowledge, are, with very few exceptions, unimpressive in the senate. The causes are obvious. A difficult and laborious profession absorbs that time, which, to make an able statesman, it is indispensable should be given to objects of general policy. The incessant study of former enactments and records accumulates a mass of information in regard to statutes and prece-

dents, but is unfavourable to the exercise of those faculties which must be roused into action in order to provide for combinations of circumstances perpetually varying, and contingencies perpetually new.

Were the study of the law indeed conducted in this country as it ought, it might well be considered a proper preparation for the duties of a statesman. Judicial may be no less necessary than political interference in the transactions which take place between the members of a community; and an intimate knowledge of the general principles which regulate these transactions, as well as of the actual circumstances in which the society is placed, seems equally essential to the complete education of the lawyer as of the politician. But while the study of the law consists almost wholly in a knowledge of forms, of an ill-contrived technical jargon, and of a mass of decisions and regulations, without any attention to the circumstances in which they originated, the principles on which

they are founded, or their defects and possible improvements—the study of the law cannot fit a man for any employment beyond the precincts of a court of justice.

This extraordinary measure of giving the Chief Justice a voice in the Cabinet, might suit the arrangement of parties, but it does not suit the country. It might gratify his Lordship, but it gives him no real exaltation. It renders more prominent that part of his character which is least admired. We reverence inflexible integrity and eminent talents in the Judge—in the Senator we recognise the common passions and prejudices of men.

2. The accession of Lord Sidmouth to a Cabinet, of which Mr. Fox and Lord Grenville were the leading members, was matter equally of surprise and censure. So glaring an inconsistency is not to be excused by attributing similar conduct to Mr. Pitt. There were no such radical grounds of difference between his Lord-

ship and Mr. Pitt as between his Lordship and the present Ministers. Of the three years of Lord Sidmouth's administration, Mr. Pitt concurred in and supported the measures of the first two. In the third year, upon the renewal of the war, he gave an example of constitutional and temperate opposition, which, let us hope for our country's sake, will not be soon forgotten. He disapproved of several important parts of the conduct of Administration; but he continued to give them that assistance which he considered due to men of irreproachable intentions. He was desirous to introduce more decision and celerity into our military preparations; yet, instead of thwarting, he supported the measures of Ministers. Instead of impeding their progress by new propositions from himself, he transfused his own energy into theirs. A negotiation for his return to office had been broken off under circumstances which he conceived the ground of just resentment towards Lord Sidmouth. But, contrary to the almost

uniform example of statesmen, his personal indignation led to no public opposition; he was satisfied in telling the House of Commons that he was detached from Administration, and took no part in advising their measures, except in Parliament. Conduct, so temperate and patriotic, endeared him to many who had formerly admired only his talents. Even among his opponents there was not a man, alive to generous sentiments, or open to conviction, who did not forget all former hostility, and join in the general approbation.

An opposition on such moderate and impartial principles as these, we are still fortunate enough to possess in Mr. Wilberforce and other independent gentlemen. They, however, have never been in office, and are unconnected with party; they are strangers, therefore, to those circumstances which intriguing men render instrumental to their ambitious designs, and which, even in the upright, have a powerful tendency to interest the feelings

and biass the judgment. But a Minister out of office is almost unavoidably exposed to the influence of party connexion. And in a leading Statesman, I know not, in our history, a parallel to the dignified and impartial conduct of Mr. Pitt.

It was not until the Addington ministry had put a negative upon several of his most important military propositions, and that our navy was hastening to decay, that Mr. Pitt considered it incumbent on him to make serious exertions for their removal from office. How differently had they been treated by Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox! His Lordship had combated and ridiculed every measure they had brought forward; and Mr. Fox, not contented with opposing particular propositions, declared them the weakest Administration who had ever governed the country. Despised, however, and vilified as he has been, Lord Sidmouth, instead of honourably disdaining the connexion, is induced to sit in the Cabinet with those whom he never can for-

give. After laying claim to the confidence of his Sovereign and the Country by a uniform appearance of candour and disinterestedness, he is tempted to a connexion with men of the most opposite principles, by an office, nominal in every respect but income. Indebted to Mr. Pitt for his introduction into public life, by the appointment to the high rank of Speaker, and professing throughout the greatest veneration for his talents and principles, his Lordship feels now no hesitation to act with the man who had been through life the opponent of his benefactor. Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox, who had formerly differed in every thing, excepting the ridicule of Addington, now agree, with wonderful harmony, in recommending him as one of the confidential servants of the Crown *.

* The publication by the French of the intercepted letters in the Admiral Aplin undeceived the public in regard to a most important political transaction. On the unexpected appointment of Mr. Addington to the head of the new Administration in 1801, it was generally believed, from his intimate connexion with Mr.

3. The remission of the unpaid penalties for the Additional Force Act, and the reimbursement of those which had been

Pitt, from his apparent unfitness for the situation, and from Mr. Pitt's reputed love of power, that Mr. Addington was only a glove for the hand that still continued to guide the reins of Government. This opinion was openly declared by the Opposition. Mr. Fox, with his usual discretion, harangued the Whig Club about a King who threatened to send his jack-boot to direct his Senate, and that we might now see the Jack-boot's jack-boot. This sagacious insinuation, however, is disproved by Lord Grenville's letter to Marquis Wellesley of the 12th of July 1803 (intercepted and published), in which his Lordship, in speaking of the Ministry, says, "Mr. Pitt did *not* recommend Addington; and who that knew him would have done it?" Again; Mr. Henry Wellesley, in a letter to his brother by the same conveyance, dated 28th of July 1803, after mentioning that Mr. Pitt and Mr. Addington were no longer on speaking terms, uses these remarkable expressions: "Mr. Pitt opposes daily the Defence Bill in the House, but he opposes it as a Counsellor; and by his very objections, he has rendered it fit for its intended purposes, which would otherwise never have been the case."

Those who justly appreciated Mr. Pitt's manly and disinterested character knew him to be incapable either

paid, *without any compensation to the parishes who had zealously fulfilled the intentions of Parliament,* is one of the most extraordinary proceedings in history. We were prepared for obloquy being thrown on Mr. Pitt's measures; but we could hardly expect in a Ministry, pourtrayed in such glowing colours, that even equity and justice should give way to resentment. By the mode adopted in rescinding this Act, those are acquitted who have contemned the authority of the Legislature; and those only have suffered who have evinced a meritorious and exemplary obedience. The anticipation of this dispo-

of Court intrigue for the appointment of a Minister, or of an insidious support in Parliament for his continuance in office. But the aspersions were plausible, and the Opposition urged them with an assurance calculated to impose on all those who adopted the current report of Mr. Pitt's ambitious disposition. Of these and similar calumnies, that great man disdained to take the smallest notice; and this specious assertion might have continued to mislead the public, had not the accidental publication of Lord Grenville's letter given it an explicit denial.

sition on the part of Government was latterly the cause of the non-execution of the Act. By the actual remission of the fines, a most dangerous example is given to neglect the fulfilment of future statutes; to oppose whatever may be troublesome or disagreeable to individuals, not by a constitutional resistance to a Bill in Parliament, but by a treacherous dereliction of duty in the execution of the law.

The intention of the author of the Bill, I am aware, was to find not money but men. The payment of the fine, however, was an evil on no account to be put in competition with the inconsistency and danger of rescinding an Act of Parliament under circumstances of direct injustice to that part of the nation whose exertions had been most zealous. Did Ministers repeal the Act as a measure of popularity? It could please only a part of the nation, and of that part only those narrow minds who can rejoice at their own escape, while their neighbours have suffered. Of this

obvious consideration, Ministers must have been aware; yet for the temporary gratification of condemning a measure of their predecessors, they have put on record, in its repeal, a precedent of most injurious tendency—the pernicious effects of which will take a deep and permanent root, and will continue in destructive operation when the Act itself shall be forgotten.

4. Complaints of the exclusion of merit from the high offices of State, have been sounded in our ears these twenty years. The failures of our expeditions, and the errors in the administration of important departments at home, have been uniformly ascribed to the employment of incompetent persons, and to the exclusion of the tried servants of the State. Party-favour, in short, has been the theme of the bitterest reproaches from the late Opposition. Pledged as they were to the preference of merit, and possessing ample choice of able men by the union of parties, what a selection have they made for the Treasurership

of the Ordnance! They have intrusted the control over millions of the public money to a man, by profession a contractor and a banker, that line which, of all others, offers the greatest facility for a lucrative use of the public treasure. They have promoted to a station of high rank, a private trader unknown to the public service of his country: and they have associated with themselves a man convicted, by an impartial tribunal, of bribery and corruption.

It will not avail them to plead, in apology, the recommendation of *higher* influence. As the Ministers of a free country, it is their duty to correct the misrepresentations to which *Princes* are exposed, and to inculcate the value of public opinion. A nation characterized by rectitude of sentiment and integrity of conduct, requires its public officers to be exempt, not only from the censure of the law, but even from suspicion. Adulation, or pretended purity, may deceive an *individual*, but they will

not deceive a people. Of the talents of its servants, the public is not, perhaps, the fittest judge; but it will seldom err in the broad distinction between honour and immorality. That to remove from offices of trust whoever shall have forfeited the public confidence, is necessary for the popularity of Government, will be readily acknowledged. It is a kindred maxim with the wise saying, "that a King of England, to be powerful or happy, must reign in the hearts of his people."

5. The refusal of a vote of thanks for the capture of so very valuable a possession as the Cape of Good Hope, is an act of unprecedented injustice. The time taken for its achievement was short; but are we not indebted in a great degree for the promptitude of our success, to the skill and gallantry of the attack? To the timid or unskilful, every enterprise is difficult. Has our navy the less merit because the destruction of an enemy has now become the work of a few hours? Had the attack on

the Cape been mismanaged, the force opposed to our expedition was sufficiently large to have repelled it. But the question has long been decided by repeated precedents. Both the value of the object and the difficulty of capture were much greater than on former occasions, when honours were conferred, and the national gratitude expressed. Let it be contrasted in both respects with the conquest of Tobago, Demerara, or Surinam, and say, whether it is fair to deprive the Commanders on this occasion of the fair meed of their gallantry.

The injustice of the measure is aggravated by its inconsistency. The tribute of national gratitude is withheld from our brave defenders by Ministers who profess the most anxious solicitude in their behalf. Sir Home Popham is not, indeed, attached to Lord St. Vincent; but may he not justly claim the patronage of an Administration which pretends to make no distinction of parties, but to unite the talents, and reward the merits of all?

6. The next subject of my attention regards the Right Hon. Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Were an admirer of that gentleman desired to select any late conspicuous display of his talents, he would probably name his speech on 23d April last, on the hostile conduct of Prussia. Let us examine the prudence and consistency of this celebrated oration.

The Right Hon. Secretary had very lately given his sanction to the Inquiry we have reviewed, a work replete with the condemnation of the haughty and intemperate conduct of former Ministers towards foreign countries. In the beginning of his speech itself, he advises mild and conciliatory language: in what manner does he exemplify the moderation he thus prescribes to himself, and recommends to others? By terming the seizure of Hanover an outrage unprecedented in the history of the worst proceedings of the worst times of Europe — the union of every thing contemptible in servility with every

thing odious in rapacity! In the prelude, he states this to be the measure of France; but soon forgetting this admission, he arraigns it as the act of Prussia. He declares in his outset, that Prussia had been forced into the conduct he now deprecates; but proceeding in his speech, he makes the important discovery, that this compulsion was only partial, and that, though obliged to cede Anspach and Bayreuth, she was *not* obliged to seize Hanover. And he concludes this most judicious and conciliating harangue, by declaring this great Power (who is naturally our ally, and whom he had declared it bad policy to irritate) to be in the last stage of complete vassalage, and to have become the contemptible instrument of the injustice of a master.

Such is the consistency and moderation of that *great man*, to whom it was called presumption in Mr. Pitt to consider himself a rival!

7. There is no talent of more essential importance to a country, in those who are placed at the head of its affairs, than the capacity of penetrating into the characters around them, and of making the wisest selections for the various departments of Government. Unless this be accomplished, it is in vain that some able men occupy the very highest situations; if the accomplishment of their views be intrusted to assistants of a different character, the best plans may become nugatory in the execution. But whether from want of sagacity to penetrate into character, or from certain other motives, which lull that sagacity asleep, there are more instances than one, in which the choice of the present Administration seems to be very different from what the welfare of the nation requires. Let us turn our eyes to the most important station which it is in the power of a British Cabinet to confer, the government of our vast possessions in the East Indies. The exasperated state of the powers who surround these possessions, the pernicious animosi-

ties which subsist between the servants of Government and of the country in that quarter, and the still more dangerous jealousies which have for years continued to increase between the Directors and the Board of Controul; all require that the supreme government of India should be intrusted to a man of known prudence and exemplary moderation. The temptations which immense power and the opportunity of extending it still farther, afford to ambition, demand that the Governor General should be a man in whom the love of rule ever yields with facility to a sense of public duty, and who is too careless of personal aggrandizement to make the slightest sacrifice for its attainment. The embarrassment of the Company's finances, the exhausted state of its finest provinces, the ruin which must ensue from augmenting the expences and exactions of Government, by again plunging into war: all these circumstances require a Governor General who shall regard the waste of public money with a degree of horror, and be impressed

with the conviction, that rigid economy is indispensable, not only to the prosperity, but to the salvation of our Indian empire.

But which of these qualities is found in Lord Lauderdale? For his moderation, let us look back to his public conduct when in Parliament, where, by the violence of his declamations, he obtained distinction even among the most violent. For the discretion that guides his ambition, let us appeal to the citizens of London, who saw him come down to the Common Hall, and condescend to solicit the Livery as a candidate for the office of Sheriff. For his sense of the indispensable necessity of public economy, we have not to refer to speeches which may have been ill-reported, or to actions which may have been misconstrued. We have his opinions on this important subject, fully stated and eagerly enforced in the work which he has lately given to the world on public wealth. We there find that private wealth is public poverty, and private poverty, public wealth; that eco-

nomy is the certain way to beggar a nation, and prodigality an infallible method of raising it to opulence; that to pay off a national debt is in every point of view a most ruinous and impoverishing measure; and that the heaviest taxation serves only to circulate the wealth of a country!!! Such are the avowed tenets of the man who has been selected for the government of India. In looking around for the merits which have entitled him to this distinction, we find that he has been a constant and violent adherent to the old Opposition; that he lost his seat in Parliament in consequence; that he was considered a martyr to their cause, and that in the day of prosperity it was deemed just to bestow a signal reward on his attachment. By being made, however, a British peer, he has already obtained an ample indemnity for his late exclusion. To appoint him Governor General of India, in order to avenge him of Lord Melville, would be a monstrous retaliation *.

* It deserves observation, that the reputed author, or assistant author of the "Inquiry into the State of

I might add that the Property Tax, formerly the most obnoxious to the present Administration of all Mr. Pitt's financial measures, and the object of their most clamorous resistance, has been not only continued, but almost doubled by them in a single stage. The measures on which I have animadverted, and others of a similar

the Nation," was also the writer of a severe exposure of Lord Lauderdale's work on public wealth. This criticism appeared in the Edinburgh Review for July 1804, and so much irritated his Lordship as to draw from him an indignant and very angry reply. The critic answered in a pamphlet, in which he drew a parallel between his Lordship and Dennis, and exposed to public ridicule both the noble author and his opinions.

Mr. Fox, the zealous patron of his Lordship, has doubtless read his book and approved its principles. In the overflow of admiration, he may have declared it, like Mr. Francis's speech, *unanswerable*. If official avocations will allow, I should beg leave to direct his attention to the Review I have mentioned. A perusal of it will probably alter his sentiments of his Lordship's work, and induce him to qualify the warmth of former approbation, by declaring that in calling it unanswerable, he meant of course it was so, *unless some one should be able to answer it*.

nature, have already very much impaired the popularity of the new Ministry. Mr. Fox, so long the strenuous champion of popular rights, the jealous observer of Ministers, has become in office an accommodating colleague, a pliant imitator of his predecessors. The adoption of those principles which it has been the object of his life to urge with vehemence, he now good-naturedly adjourns to a future period. He accounted them formerly of sufficient magnitude to hazard the division of the country. Such is now his additional stock of prudence, that he will not for their sake divide even the Cabinet. To the majority of his own party, who believed that all he said was sincere, and all that he proposed practicable; who, on his coming into office, were big with the expectation of that radical change which he had declared to be our only remaining chance of salvation, the disappointment has been inexpressible. His consequent loss of popularity has been incalculable. With the opposite party his conduct in office has had a tendency to

tranquillize fear without procuring esteem. Those keen partisans of the late Ministry, who from his constant and violent opposition considered him devoid of all principle, are pleased, without a minute scrutiny of his motives, to find him pursue that course which raises a lasting monument to Mr. Pitt's fame, while it affixes the seal of condemnation to himself. Those calmer minds, who explained the inveteracy of his opposition by the warmth of his temperament, and who considered his speeches in general to be the effusions of the moment, have experienced no surprise from his late conduct. They had always deemed him a man of more imagination than judgment. His talents they knew were great, but inadequately cultivated. They had no sanguine expectations from his coming into office; but they had some dread of danger from the practical execution of former declarations. Of this dread they now begin to be relieved, and they consider it infinitely better for the country that a party should be inconsistent, than that the public safety should be compromised. The contrast

therefore between the present and former conduct of the old Opposition affords them matter of security: but this security, however satisfactory in itself, is unmixed with any approving sentiment towards the quarter from whence it is derived. From Mr. Fox, the adoption of Mr. Pitt's measures proceeds with the worst grace, since it implies the dereliction of those principles for which he has so long and so violently contended. He must be impressed with a conviction either of the wisdom of Mr. Pitt's plans, or of the reverse. In the former case, he has made a very sudden discovery that he has himself been mistaken throughout; that the objects of his hostility to Ministers, and of his promises during so many years to the country, have been fallacious, and his long course of opposition captious, wanton, and criminal; or if he still retain his former sentiments, it will be difficult to explain his conduct in other terms than those the Morning Chronicle lately applied to the Governor, *ad interim*, of India, when desirous to make him give way for Lord Lauderdale; namely,

" by commending his personal policy and prudence at the expence of some other qualifications which alone can entitle any man to esteem in private life or to the confidence of the public."

Of the motives indeed which have induced such a change, different opinions will be entertained. Conversion by argument in so short a time, will hardly be alledged at the mature age of sixty. Some persons, and among these many of the most zealous of his former friends, will explain his conduct as originating in the vulgar feeling already alluded to—the desire of keeping in place. Others, with more courtesy, and we hope with more truth, however perplexed to reconcile his past and present conduct, stoutly reject this idea as unworthy of so distinguished a statesman.

Of the talents of the present Ministry a more decided opinion may be given. A most liberal portion of praise has been assigned them by their adherents. The writer of the pamphlet now under review,

after extolling them in terms of the most fulsome adulation, adds, " No compromise of principles, no paltry half-measures, no incongruous mixture of big words and little doings, will bear them out in redeeming their pledge to save the country." Were not the author evidently devoted to the cause of Ministers, it would be natural to consider him a *mauvais plaisant*, amusing the public at their expence. They have been a considerable time in office, and what have they done? Have they performed any thing commensurate with the lavish encomiums of their friends or the public expectations? Had Mr. Pitt proceeded in that course of injustice, inconsistency, and error, which has characterized so many of their measures, how loudly would they have exposed his conduct to public reprobation! If the author of the Inquiry is desirous to give a faithful description of their conduct since they came into office, let me recommend to him to *reverse* exactly the sentence I have quoted. He will neither impair its fluency, nor will he be distant from the truth.

If the public expectation has been disappointed in the Ministry, the conclusion is fair that their talents were over-rated. With the exception of Lord Grenville, the leading members of Administration have been eminent only in opposition. Now it is much easier to harangue with plausibility than to act with wisdom. There is generally much more to be said against than in favour of a subject. The opponent of Ministry has an advantage similar to that of the general who acts on the offensive. The enemy's positions lie before him, and he may choose his point of attack. If this advantage be acknowledged, and it will hardly be disputed, I am justified in attributing a very considerable portion of the reputation of the late Opposition for ability to this cause. Mr. Fox has long been the chief of this party, and held up by them to the country as an unparalleled assemblage of all that is wise and great. Instead therefore of discussing the merits of the minor members, I shall proceed at once to examine the pretensions of their leader.

No man, of even the best natural parts, can become without application a profound statesman. The most acute penetration will not avail, unless exercised in diligent research. The benefit of experience from a long political life, embracing every vicissitude of situation, and bringing under discussion almost every important question, will be inadequately reaped by a mind averse from assiduous investigation. The expression of manly sentiments is always gratifying to a British audience, for it promises independence and vigour. But what avails animation of language or of thought, without a correspondent firmness of conduct? That fertile imagination, which on the first view of a subject suggests argument upon argument in rapid succession, is the certain evidence of genius, and constitutes a forcible orator. But in the great statesman we expect not only natural ardour and impressive eloquence, but a profound knowledge of every important political question, and an unshaken adherence to fixed maxims. These are not the spontaneous fruits of na-

ture, even in her richest soil. They are the precious result of talents and industry combined---the effects of scrupulous research and careful meditation. Let us apply these remarks to the Right Hon. Secretary for Foreign Affairs. On particular occasions his eloquence has blazed forth with luminous splendour, while at other times his speeches have been apparently the crude effusions of the moment.

It is proper I should support by illustration an opinion of Mr. Fox so different from what his friends are desirous to promulgate. I shall select therefore for examination his sentiments on a subject upon which, above all others, it is indispensable that a British statesman should have the fullest information, and entertain opinions formed on the most decided conviction---a subject, of which the ignorance in a Minister involves not only his own disgrace, but the fate of the country itself---I mean the defence of Britain against invasion.

This most important topic has been a very frequent and anxious object of parliamentary discussion. During the first year of the present war, both Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox were detached from all share in Administration. What a contrast was exhibited in their conduct! We saw Mr. Pitt bestow on the defence of the country the most indefatigable attention, and discover in his speeches that profound knowledge of military science, the acquisition of which is to most men the labour of a lifetime: while he roused the country by his ardour, he enlightened it by his wisdom. Mr. Fox, on the other hand, spoke like one who had never studied the subject; who rose to repel with vehemence a particular point, but took no comprehensive view of the various relations of the whole system. Even on the debate, which through Mr. Pitt's support produced the resignation of the Addington Ministry, when Mr. Fox had summoned the attention both of the House and of the country; when the "prize contended" was the fate of an administra-

tion; when the subject of discussion was the defence of Britain, and Mr. Fox the leader of the debate, his speech was vague, superficial, and defective to a degree altogether unworthy the importance of the occasion.

It may be urged, that his object on this occasion (23d of April 1804) was less to make impression by his own eloquence, than to choose with dexterity a point which might unite Mr. Pitt in a joint attack on the Addington Ministry. I shall admit that this circumstance may account for a want of energy on this occasion on the part of Mr. Fox; but no man will advance it to justify any radical fallacy in the measures he proposed, especially since one of the principal measures (an armed peasantry), so far from having been abandoned, has been revived in a conspicuous shape, under the denomination of trained men, in the new military regulations. The plan of an armed peasantry thus becomes incorporated in a modified shape into

our system of defence. This qualification bears the presumptive marks of a compromise of sentiment between the two Right Honourable Secretaries for the War and Foreign Departments. The one, it would appear, must have urged the superiority of a large regular force; while the other sagaciously adhered to his favourite system of an armed peasantry. The adoption of a happy medium appears to have been the result. Mr. Windham consents to introduce the peasantry, provided Mr. Fox will assimilate them in some degree to the regulars. It is important therefore to examine the degree of efficient resistance which may be expected from an armed peasantry, or from trained men, in the event of invasion.

The local knowledge of the peasantry was a leading feature in Mr. Fox's recommendation of this description of force. Yet although he judged fit to term them irresistible, a little reflection will convince us, that in regard to efficient operations, in this country, local knowledge is a chimera.

The peasant, it is obvious, knows the locality only of a particular district: beyond that he possesses neither knowledge nor an aptitude for its acquisition. This precious quality then of local knowledge is necessarily confined to very few. And if the peasant know very little more than a French soldier of any district except his own, the inaptitude of the former to extend his knowledge by observation, will not be compared with the activity and ardour of the Frenchman.

Local knowledge can be of use only in the neighbourhood of military operations. The French will keep together in strong and compact corps. Nothing will have divided them, unless they have separated on the passage, and been obliged to land on different points. Even in that case, the different bodies will strain every nerve to form a junction, and their object will be to advance with combined strength, by forced marches, to London. Against such formidable assailants, what would avail the efforts

more men than the enemy. By these incessant interruptions, they will buy their progress with a loss of lives, which to them will be irreparable; the time required for their march will be doubled, and, before they reach the capital, they will be harassed to such a degree that a battle may be hazarded without imprudence. If we are beaten, our superior cavalry will cover our retreat, and our numbers will supply a fresh army ready to engage the enemy next day. Let it be our practice, whether in general or partial engagements, to avoid manœuvring, and to come, at every proper opportunity, to *close action* with the enemy. It is chiefly in this rude combat that we are superior to the French; in stratagem and artifice we should wage with them a hopeless warfare. The flower of that force which has subjugated Europe will be brought against us; and unless they are opposed with incessant vigour, they will bear down every obstacle, and rush forward like a torrent.

How unavailing in such a contest would be the tardy efforts of an armed peasantry! To the inexperience of recruits, they join the heaviness natural to their mode of life: their numbers would not correct the evil of their inefficiency, but would engender a confusion calculated to increase it. Had we 200,000, or even 500,000 peasants in arms, the issue would be the same. The French army, unless opposed by a regular force, would sweep the country like a whirlwind. The peasants might fight with courage, and support, in honourable death, Mr. Fox's opinion of the national spirit. But this resistance would be ineffectual, and their feeble efforts would not prevent the French from reaching London before our Right Honourable Secretary had recovered from his surprise at the overthrow of his favourite force.

I have no wish to insinuate that Mr. Fox has ever represented an armed peasantry as sufficient for our defence without a regular army. Misrepresentation is not neces-

sary to my arguments, and will not, I trust, be ascribed to my work. My object is distinctly to state, that the plan of an armed peasantry, so strongly urged by Mr. Fox, is, in this open country, and against such an enemy as the French, not only inefficient, but nugatory; that to describe such a force as *irresistible* is a proof of gross ignorance; that such evidence of error on the part of the Right Honourable Secretary cannot fail to impair the authority attached to his opinion, and justify us to question the accuracy of his assertions in every matter in which they are not accompanied by proof.

Of this vague and unsatisfactory nature are his sentiments on the subject of Invasion. He has expressed himself entirely tranquil on this head, and considers the attempt neither likely to be made, nor dangerous to us, if tried. The grounds of his confidence are the superiority of our army and the spirit of the people. These are neither new discoveries, nor sentiments peculiar to himself. Few will differ from

him in considering our countrymen the bravest, as they are the freest nation in Europe: but of the inefficiency of courage without discipline against veteran troops, I have already treated at some length; and I refer the Right Honourable Secretary for ampler information to his friends Mr. Windham and Colonel Crawford. These gentlemen, I apprehend, will tell him, that the spirit of a gallant nation is valuable, as affording to Government abundant means of preparation; but that on the day of invasion, we must not depend on the people, but on our army.

In regard to our navy, no man will differ from Mr. Fox in an opinion of its decided superiority to the enemy. But when the strength of our Boulogne squadron is not to the adverse force in the proportion of one to ten, it becomes important to inquire what other circumstances justify the security so confidently entertained by Mr. Fox. I beg leave to submit to him a few considerations on this momentous subject.

1. Our late naval victories, while they insure the safety of Ireland, have lessened very little the degree of danger from Boulogne.

2. Bonaparte, naturally presumptuous, is inflated with late success. He is no longer deterred from the experiment of invasion by the apprehension of domestic insurrection or foreign invasion in the event of failure. Hatred to Britain is his predominant passion; and where he cannot conquer, he will delight to lay waste. His professions of peace should be viewed, like his flag of truce to Acre, as artifices to lull our vigilance asleep.

3. The chief disadvantage of Boulogne, Ambleteuse, and Vimereux, has hitherto been the difficulty of ingress and egress. The French have been indefatigable in their improvements, and the number of craft which can now be brought out in twenty-four hours, is not, I apprehend, over-rated at five hundred.

4. A flotilla of two thousand gun-vessels may be moored in Boulogne bay under the protection of the batteries, and secure from our attacks. They may ride there in safety, unless in strong gales, which, during the summer months, it is known, do not frequently occur.

5. In the event of the sailing of the flotilla, we shall be able to oppose to it only the force which may then be on the Boulogne station, or in the Downs. The easterly wind which brings out the flotilla, will prevent the arrival, till too late, of assistance from Portsmouth; and our force to the northward will be occupied by the movements (doubtless simultaneous) of the Dutch in the Texel, the Maese, and the Scheldt.

6. Yet although it cannot be unknown, that we can depend only on the force appointed to the Boulogne station, that force is allowed to remain in a state of inadequacy. If the French sail, as is likely, in

temperate weather, what would be the probable issue of the conflict? I certainly do not under-rate the exertions of our squadrons, when I suppose them to capture or destroy twice their own force. But even this degree of success would neither arrest the course of the expedition, or make any great deduction from its immense numbers.

7. I am aware that it may be urged, that in the event of the preparations at Boulogne assuming a serious aspect, our squadron may be considerably reinforced. But in what will this reinforcement chiefly consist? Not in sloops and gun-brigs, which are the best description of force for opposing the Boulogne flotilla, whether in the passage or the landing, but in large ships of war, which are incapable of acting in shoal water, and ill calculated to destroy any considerable number of the small vessels of the enemy during the temperate weather, of which it is probable they will make choice to put to sea.

These considerations prove, that invasion is a more serious danger than Mr. Fox appears to believe. That it would ultimately end in the defeat of the enemy, cannot justly be doubted; but the ravage they might make is incalculable, and the present question is not their final success, but the probability of the attempt.

If Mr. Fox, in expressing his opinion on invasion, will take a comprehensive view of its various chances under different contingencies, and, adducing satisfactory arguments for its *speedy* defeat under every probable combination of circumstances, demonstrate, that not merely its issue but its progress would be so hopeless, as to offer no strong inducement to the vindictive mind of Bonaparte to tempt the hazards of the enterprise: in that case Mr. Fox's confidence will be justified. He will not only enjoy security himself, he will communicate it likewise to the country; but without a full and conclusive exposition of this nature, the nation must give no attention to

the opinion or assertion of any man, in a question which involves its existence; especially if proceeding from a quarter where we are blamed for not having conducted offensive operations, by landing our troops *detached from support* in the country of the most active enemy in Europe, and where so languid a mass as an armed peasantry is described as irresistible.

The present publication has been currently denominated the Manifesto of the new Ministry. This title is, in one respect, not inapplicable; for an invading enemy could not have scattered a declaration more calculated to depress the spirit of the country. Although professedly an Inquiry into the State of the *Nation*, it fulfils but a small part of its title; for its researches extend only to those points in our national situation which it suits Mr. Fox's purpose

to examine. It endeavours, by every species of misrepresentation, to throw odium upon the late Ministry, and to constitute them the authors of all the disasters of last campaign. It describes the situation of Europe, and of this country, as to the last degree calamitous, in order that the nation may feel grateful to the present Ministers, for having *consented* to undertake the management of affairs at this pretended crisis, and may shut its eyes to the contrast between the splendour of their former promises, and the insignificance of their performance — between the abuse which they used to lavish on their predecessors, and the approbation they now confer by adopting the measures which they formerly reprobated. Delusions of this nature may impose on the credulity of the French, but the British nation are not to be thus blinded; they will not acknowledge *that* to be a just report of the state of the nation, in which all mention is studiously avoided of their trade, their finances, and their navy; a trade extensive and flourishing beyond example; a navy

triumphant in every quarter of the globe; finances, in which in the thirteenth year of war a loan is effected below the legal rate of interest, and our immense expences defrayed, without increasing the national debt one fiftieth of its amount. The country is not in such terror of France as to consent to any peace which does not effectually provide for their honour and security. They will support the East India Company against Mr. Fox in their refusal to intrust the care of our Indian empire to a nobleman who has proved himself incapable of acting either wisely of his own accord, or of taking prudent advice from others. They will withhold their confidence from that Ministry which bestows offices of trust and emolument on such men as the Treasurer of the Ordnance: and until they see a wiser choice of measures, with a more upright selection of servants, they will refuse to acknowledge the pretensions of the new Ministry (so *modestly* expressed in the publication which has been examined), "to unite the largest portion of talents,

experience, rank, and integrity, which ever enabled a government to secure influence with its subjects, and command respect among foreign nations." The establishment of a commission for auditing the public accounts, to an amount *nominally* immense, may be a dexterous expedient for popularity; but the public will not accept it as a *real* discharge of the pledges so often given to effect that radical change, in which was affirmed to consist "our only remaining chance of salvation."

An Administration skilful only in heaping censures on their predecessors, will not now avail us. In that respect, the abilities of the present Ministry have long been undoubted. But the country now demands of them, "Either prove to us by your actions that you surpass your predecessors, or resign in unequivocal terms the pretensions you have made."

If a secure and honourable peace can be obtained, there will be no necessity to pre-

pare the public mind by the circulation of pamphlets, the obvious tendency of which is to disseminate depression. Unless the peace be secure and honourable, we shall act wisely to prefer war with all its burdens, to a deceitful truce with a tyrant so arrogant, so perfidious, and so insatiably ambitious as Bonaparte. Before we can intrust with confidence a negotiation with so artful an adversary to Mr. Fox, he must give very different proofs of wisdom from any he has yet afforded, whether in his former erroneous sentiments of the French ruler, in his late speeches in Parliament, or in sanctioning a pamphlet which accuses the head of Administration while it insults the country—which declares to the British nation, "that it is in vain to look around for any circumstance which may soften the gloomy picture drawn of its affairs, while it is impossible to imagine any addition which may aggravate them."

If Mr. Fox proceed in a course of such egregious imprudence, if while he pro-

claims moderation he shall endeavour to force obnoxious men into the most important stations; if he flatter himself, that by scattering abuse on his predecessors, he will blind the nation to his own errors, or be acquitted by nominal reforms of the pledges he has given the country, the consequence will be a total loss of public confidence, and his present, like his former administration, will be the transient vision of a few months. Let him exemplify the wise, just, and moderate policy he has so long recommended, or he will in vain endeavour to soothe the public indignation by such insidious appeals as the work we have now examined. Fallacy and misrepresentation have had their day.

THE END.

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